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T HERE were major developments in several areas during the survey period.
In addition to several significant decisions by Texas and federal courts,
there were major legislative and administrative developments. Finally, the
American Bar Association adopted a firm position with respect to a problem
troubling attorneys involved in securities practice-the extent to which
obligations owed to the public to prevent violations of the federal securities
acts conflict with traditional duties owed to clients.
I. GENERAL CORPORATE DEVELOPMENTS
The Corporation as a Partner. One of the more interesting cases arising
during the survey period is Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd.- This case
involved the rather common practice of creating a limited partnership with a
corporation as the sole general partner and the investors in the venture
assuming the role of limited partners. The justification for creating such a
combination of forms is to secure for the investors partnership tax treatment
combined with de facto limited liability. 2 Numerous so-called "tax shelters"
utilize this combination of forms, with the hope that contemplated tax losses
may be utilized by the limited partners to shield other income from taxation.
In Delaney the limited partnership, Fidelity Lease Limited, was the lessee
of a lease; the general partner was a corporation named Interlease Corpora-
tion; there were twenty-two limited partners, including three who were
officers and directors of Interlease Corporation. The lease was clearly
executed in the name of the limited partnership by Interlease acting as
general partner; Interlease, in turn, was represented "by" its president (who
was also one of the limited partners but who clearly signed as an agent of the
corporation). The lessors proceeded to erect the required fast food service
restaurant on the land, but the limited partnership breached its lease and
never took possession. The lessor brought suit against the limited partner-
ship, the corporate general partner, and the twenty-two limited partners.
While the issue determinative of the case became whether the three limited
* B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., University of Chicago. Vinson, Elkins, Searls,
Connally and Smith Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. 517 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974), rev'd in part, 526 S.W.2d 543
(Tex. 1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 791 (1975).
2. The Internal Revenue Service will issue rulings that such hybrid organizations
qualify for partnership status under certain circumstances. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1
CuM. BULL. 735; Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438. These circumstances in-
clude, among others, (1) the limited partners own not more than 20% of the stock of
the general partner, (2) the corporate general partner's net worth is at least 15% of
the contributions to the partnership (or $250,000, whichever is the lesser), and (3) the
general partner's share of each item of partnership income or loss is at least 1 % of the
total. These tests formally relate only to the availability of a ruling and not to the sub-
stantive tax issue of how the income of such a hybrid should be taxed.
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partners who were also corporate officers and directors of the general partner
were personally liable for the obligations of the limited partnership, views
were also expressed on the broader question of the power of a corporation in
Texas to become a general partner in a limited partnership.
In the Texas Court of Civil Appeals Justice Ward, Justice Osborn, and
Chief Justice Preslar wrote three separate opinions. Justice Ward, writing
the principal opinion, first concluded that it was permissible for a corporation
to be a general partner, relying on both the earlier decision by the Supreme
Court of Texas in Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow3 and the secretary of
state's consistent practice of accepting for filing limited partnership certifi-
cates in which a corporation is the sole general partner. 4  The justice then
turned to the critical provision of the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership
Act which states, "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general
partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a
limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business." 5  The justice
acknowledged that "[flf the language of this Statute is all controlling in
importance" then the three limited partners who dominated the affairs of the
corporate general partner would be personally liable. Nevertheless, he
reached an opposite result by turning to "our basic notions of corporations."' 6
Pointing out that the plaintiff was not misled as to who was liable on the
lease, and that the plaintiff voluntarily dealt with the limited partnership and
the corporate general partner as such, the justice analogized the situation to
contract cases where attempts are made to "pierce the corporate veil."'7 The
general position of the Texas courts in such cases is that in the absence of
fraud or misleading conduct, a third person deals with a marginally capital-
ized corporation at his own risk, and that the use of a nominally capitalized
corporation is often a device by which the risk of loss in a contractual
arrangement is allocated by the parties." Finally, Justice Ward closed with
this statement:
Admittedly, the decision in the case before us is not free from doubt.
The logical reason to hold a limited partner to general liability under
the control prohibition of the Statute is to prevent third parties from
mistakenly assuming that the limited partner is a general partner and
to rely on his general liability. However, it is hard to believe that
a creditor would be deceived where he knowingly deals with a general
3. 155 Tex. 612, 291 S.W.2d 312 (1956).
4. This policy received indirect approval in an opinion of the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral. See TEX. Ar'Y GEN. Op. No. WW-191 (1957), withdrawn on other grounds,
TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. WW-191-A (1958). It is also described in the "Fil-
ing Guide for Corporation and Limited Partnership Instruments" published by the
secretary of state's office in 1974. See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 212, 255 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as HAMILTON].
5. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (1970). The referenced section
is § 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Throughout the balance of this Article
the Texas numeration will be used.
6. 517 S.W.2d at 423.
7. HAMILTON § 234.
8. Id. The justice was kind in quoting extensively from my Texas Practice treatise
when developing this argument.
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partner which is a corporation. That in itself is a creature specifically
devised to limit liability.9
Justice Osborn concurred with Justice Ward on the rather narrow ground
that there was no evidence showing that the defendants induced or misled
the plaintiff into entering into the lease because of the defendants' individual
or personal liability, and "[h]aving made their contract it is not for this Court
to rewrite it and provide new and additional liabilities of parties who had
originally limited their liability."'10
Chief Justice Preslar dissented on several grounds." In his view a
corporation could not be a general partner under the Texas statutes. Port
Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow was distinguished on the entirely correct
ground that the court in that case held only that a corporation could be a
limited partner in a partnership, and the chief justice believed that the pre-
Uniform Partnership Act decisions holding that corporations could not be
general partners continued to have vitality. 12 Furthermore, the chief justice
argued that even under the Uniform Act a corporation could not be a
general partner because section 21 of the Texas Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act refers to dissolution upon the retirement, death, or insanity of a
general partner; none of these events, of course, normally happens to
corporations. 13
Secondly, Justice Preslar argued that the three limited partners who were
corporate officers should be personally liable. He stated:
I find it difficult to separate their acts for they were at all times in
the dual capacity of limited partners and officers of the corporation.
Apparently the corporation had no function except to operate the lim-
ited partnership and . . . [defendants] were obligated to their other
partners to so operate the corporation as to benefit the partnership.
Each act was done then, not for the corporation, but for the partner-
ship. Indirectly, if not directly, they were exercising control over the
partnership. Truly 'the corporation function' was in this instance a fic-
tion. 14
Essentially, the problem was that the three limited partners were "wearing
too many hats," and in fact were exercising control over the affairs of the
limited partnership.
The opinion of the Texas Supreme Court is brief and to the point.
Adopting the portion of Chief Justice Preslar's opinion quoted above,
Justice Daniel stated that the limitation of section 8 of the Texas Limited
Partnership Act "cannot be evaded merely by acting through a corpora-
tion.' 15 Furthermore, the absence of reliance is beside the point because
the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not condition liability
9. 517 S.W.2d at 425.
10. Id. at 427 (Osborn, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 425 (Preslar, C.J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 191
S.W.2d 716 (1945).
13. For a discussion of this argument see notes 23-25 infra and accompanying text.
14. 517 S.W.2d at 426-27.
15. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
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under section 8 on the presence of reliance. 16 As an alternative ground, the
court referred to case law which holds that the corporate fiction will be
ignored when it is used to "circumvent a statute" and "[t]hat is precisely the
result here.""17 Finally, the court specifically reserved decision on the
question of whether a corporation could ever serve as a general partner in a
limited partnership, thereby indicating that the question was still open under
Texas law.' 8
The precise holding of the Texas Supreme Court in Delaney is that limited
partners who control the affairs of the limited partnership by serving as
officers or directors of a corporation which is the sole general partner lose
the shield of limited liability. This will have an obvious impact on the
planning of a number of ventures where the conduit-like tax treatment of
partnerships is important. In some circumstances it may be possible to
achieve substantially the same effect by .forming a corporation rather than a
limited partnership and electing subchapter S treatment if the number of
investors is less than ten. Except for this alternative, no absolutely certain
way appears to exist for the active manager of a venture to achieve the
benefits of tax losses arising from the venture unless he or she is also willing
to accept personal liability for possible losses. The active manager might
consider putting the limited partnership interest in the name of a spouse or a
corporation that elects subchapter S treatment. Also, persons active in the
venture probably can avoid unlimited liability by not becoming limited
partners; they may receive shares of the profits either through employment
relationships with the corporation-general partner or through dividends paid
on the shares issued by the corporation. Losses might 'be made available for
tax purposes if the corporation can elect subchapter S treatment. Whether
these more complicated combinations of business forms will work remains to
be seen.
The specific reservation of the question of the power of Texas corpora-
tions to be general partners in limited partnerships seems procedurally
correct, since the question was not covered by a point of error and did not
require resolution to decide the case. The author of an Annual Survey
article suffers no such procedural limitation on the expression of opinion.
Justice Daniel, writing for the court, stated that the resolution of the question
"depends upon the scope of the corporate charter . . . and upon whether we
should extend our holding in Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow . . . to
sanction corporations acting as general partners in a statutory limited
partnership."' 19  This comment overlooks the statutory provisions granting
specific powers to every corporation in the state, and the provisions of the
Texas Uniform Partnership Act and Texas Uniform Limited Partnership
Act. In 1973 article 2.02A of the Texas Business Corporation Act was
amended to provide that each corporation shall have the power-"To
be an organizer, partner, member, associate, or manager of any partnership,
16. Id.





joint venture, or other enterprise .. ".. ,20 Further, section 6 of the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act defines a "partnership" as "an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit,"' 21 and section 2
of the same Act defines "persons" as including "individuals, partnerships,
corporations, and other associations. '22  Given these definitions, it seems
difficult to avoid the conclusion that at least since 1973 every Texas corpora-
tion has the power to be a general partner in a general partnership.23 The
question then becomes: Assuming that a corporation may be a general
partner in a general partnership, is there any reason why it cannot be a
general partner in a limited partnership? Section 2 of the Texas Uniform
Limited Partnership Act defines "limited partnership" to be "a partnership
formed by two (2) or more persons under the provisions of Section 3 of this
Act, and having as members one (1) or more general partners and one (1)
or more limited partners. ' 24  A limited partnership is a sub genus of
"partnerships" in which generally corporations may be general partners. This
point is emphasized by section 6(2) of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act
which states that "this Act shall apply to limited partnerships except in so far
as the Statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith." '25
The foregoing seems to me to be almost totally persuasive.2 6 There
remain, however, two possible arguments that must be considered. The first
is the argument made by Chief Justice Preslar, in the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, that a reading of section 21 of the Texas Uniform Limited
Partnership Act shows that a corporation may not be a general partner
because a limited partnership is dissolved upon the "retirement, death or
insanity of a general partner," and these are "things which do not happen to
corporations. ' 27  The justice also added that he would not construe "per-
sons" to include corporations anywhere in the entire Act.28  While this
constructional argument has some force, I do not find it persuasive. The
Uniform Limited Partnership Act was drafted in 1916,29 almost contempo-
20. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(18) (Supp. 1975-76).
21. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6 (1970) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
23. The lease in Fidelity Lease was executed prior to the effective date of the 1973
amendments, and, in fairness to Justice Daniel, the question under the pre-1973 statutes
was considerably closer than it is today with respect to the statutes discussed in the text.
See generally HAMILTON § 121.
24. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 2 (1970) (emphasis added).
25. Id. art. 6132b, § 6(2).
26. The discussion of this question in J. CRANE & A. BROMBERO, LAW OF PARTNER-
stop (1968) is also interesting. After talking about the basis of the common law rule
that it is ultra vires for a corporation to be a partner since "partnership entails excessive
delegation, perhaps even abdication of corporate management" by the directors, the au-
thors state: "The rationale for the old rule fails, and partnerships are valid, if the corpo-
rate partner has all the powers of management. A fortiori this is true if the corporation
is the sole general partner in a limited partnership." Id. at 54. See also Tomlin v.
Ceres Corp., 507 F.2d 642, 644 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975), where the court observes that thejustification usually given for prohibiting a corporation from being a partner was that
a partnership allows the corporation to be bound by the acts of other partners, thereby
depriving the corporation's directors of management of corporate affairs, but that thisjustification has no application when the corporation is the sole general partner. While
this dictum purports to be a discussion of Texas law, there is no mention of the statutory
provisions set forth earlier in the text.
27. 517 S.W.2d at 426.
28. Id.
29. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERO, supra note 26, at 13.
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raneously with the first permanent federal income tax statute. It would be
most unlikely that the draftsmen of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
ever dreamed there might be an advantage in creating a limited partnership
with a corporate general partner, rather than by simply creating a corpora-
tion to conduct the business, with limited liability for all investors.30
A second possible argument, based upon the policy behind the Limited
Partnership Act, appears in the latter portion of Mr. Justice Daniel's opinion
for the supreme court:
It is quite clear that there can be more than one general partner. As-
suming that Interlease Corporation was a legal general partner, . . .
this would not prevent Crombie, Kahn, and Sanders from taking part
in the control of the business in their individual capacities as well as
their corporate capacities. In no event should they be permitted to
escape the statutory liability which would have devolved upon them
if there had been no attempted interposition of the corporate shield
against personal liability. Otherwise, the statutory requirement of at
least one general partner with general liability in a limited partnership
can be circumvented or vitiated by limited partners operating the part-
nership through a corporation with minimum capitalization and there-fore minimum liability.3'
The "policy" expressed in the italicized portion of the above quotation seems
to me to be gossamer. A corporation with only nominal capitalization is
nevertheless fully liable in theory for its debts in the same manner as an
individual who is judgment proof is liable for his debts. Forming a limited
partnership with a nominally capitalized corporation as the sole general
partner is theoretically indistinguishable from forming a limited partnership
with an insolvent individual as the sole general partner. A refinement of
this argument suggests that the two situations are different; the corporate
general partner permits one or more solvent limited partners "to have their
cake and eat it too" since they combine control over the corporate decisions
(and thereby control over the partnership decisions) with the preferred
status of a limited partner. But the same refined argument can always be
made when solvent persons decide to conduct a specific business in a
nominally financed corporation. The public policy that apparently has
evolved around this practice permits its use if the corporate form is not being
used unfairly. Perhaps the same test should be used to evaluate the use of
the corporate form in Delaney.
I do not mean to suggest that the questions involved in this case were
easy, or that the Supreme Court of Texas was necessarily wrong. As the
various opinions indicate, conflicting and inconsistent policies may be ap-
plied, and weighing them is a matter of judgment. My personal disagree-
30. On the other hand, it would have been likely for the draftsmen of the Uniform
Partnership Act to consider the possibility that corporations might wish to participate
as partners in a general partnership. Not only had the question been previously litigated
-thereby demonstrating that corporations in fact sometimes did desire to be partners
-but also corporations often engage in co-operative enterprises with other corporations
and with individuals.
31. 526 S.W.2d at 546 (emphasis added).
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ment may be expressed in the following two propositions: (1) the opinion of
the supreme court gives the plaintiff a windfall in the sense that the
defendants were personally liable on the lease obligation but the plaintiff did
not rely on such personal liability when entering into the lease, and (2)
while windfalls may sometimes be unavoidable to effectuate clearly defined
statutory policies, I do not see that such a policy exists in these partnership
statutes. Rather the policies relied on by the supreme court seem to be
based on a literal and rather uncritical reading of the statutes.
Piercing the Corporate Veil. One area of corporation law that has been the
subject of considerable discussion and some confusion is the extent to which
the separate existence of the corporate entity should be ignored in a variety
of different circumstances. 3 2 In Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp.33 the Supreme
Court of Texas carefully analyzed the relationship between a parent corpora-
tion and its subsidiary, and, in an opinion that is likely to become the leading
Texas precedent for the entire area, concluded that service of process on the
subsidiary within the period of statute of limitations constituted service on
the parent, since "as a matter of law, [the subsidiary is] the alter ego of [the
parent]. ''3 4
Before turning to the facts of the case before it, the court made the
following introductory comment on general legal principles:
A subsidiary corporation will not be regarded as the alter ego of
its parent merely because of stock ownership, a duplication of some
or all of the directors or officers, or an exercise of the control that
stock ownership gives to stockholders. On the other hand where man-
agement and operations are assimilated to the extent that the subsidiary
is simply a name or conduit through which the parent conducts its busi-
ness, the corporate fiction may be disregarded to prevent fraud or in-
justice. Unlike a suit for breach of contract, the plaintiff in a tort
case does not have the burden of justifying a recovery against the parent
when he willingly contracted with the subsidiary. The problem in such
a case is essentially one of allocating the loss. It is not necessary to
establish fraud, and the financial strength or weakness of the subsidiary
is an important consideration.35
This explicit statement by the Texas Supreme Court that torts cases involve
different principles from contracts cases will probably be widely cited by
lower courts. The case before the court involved an unreasonable collection
efforts claim against a consumer financing company-a tort case.
In concluding that the subsidiary, Credit Plan Corporation, was the alter
ego of the parent, Colonial Finance Company, the court carefully analyzed
the relations between the two corporations and the manner in which the
business was actually conducted. Colonial had a small galaxy of subsidi-
32. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 979 (1971). Illustrative
of the continuing nature of this problem is the fact that every Annual Survey of Texas
Law of Corporations has discussed one or more cases.
33. 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975).
34. Id. at 575.
35. Id. at 573, citing, among other cases, Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp.,




aries, all engaged in the business of making loans on the security of
automobiles, furniture, and other property. Each subsidiary operated a
separate office, usually in different cities. The same persons were officers
and directors of Colonial and Credit Plan; they had the same corporate
office and the same registered agent. The directors met at the same time
and place. The managers for each office were selected by the president of
Colonial. Credit Plan had issued 25,000 shares of stock-22,500 to Coloni-
al and 2,500 to the manager. However, ,the manager signed a note which
provided that if the manager resigned or retired Colonial had the right to
purchase his stock at the original price. In the facts of the case before the
court the manager had executed a promissory note for the purchase price of
the stock; when he left, the note and stock certificate were cancelled and a
new certificate issued in the name of the new manager, who signed a new
note. The evidence also indicated that decisions with respect to compensa-
tion were made by Colonial for all its subsidiaries; a profit-sharing plan was
proposed for the employees of "Colonial and its subsidiaries"; a bonus for
the president of Colonial was established on the basis "of ten percent of the
net income of each corporation, the bonus being allocated between the
companies on the basis of their respective net incomes"; and employee
insurance coverage was obtained in a single plan for parent and subsidiaries.
The corporate records reflecting such decisions appeared in the minutes of
Colonial's directors' meetings, in contrast to the minutes of the subsidiaries
which reflected only bare formalities.
There were other indications that Colonial and its subsidiaries were all
conducting a single business. Funds to finance the business were first
obtained by the sale of Colonial's debentures; more recently a loan agree-
ment was entered into with Walter E. Heller & Co., in which the paper
generated by all the subsidiaries was acquired by Heller. Each subsidiary
guaranteed repayment of all notes of all the subsidiaries. The loan proceeds
were paid to another subsidiary, Kelley Acceptance Corporation, that made
advances to Credit Plan and other operating subsidiaries. As the loans were
repaid by the customers, the funds were paid to Kelley. Consolidated
income tax returns were filed. Managers were routinely transferred from
one office to another [i.e. from one corporation to another], and in one
instance, two offices were combined.
Based on such evidence, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that "Credit
Plan was operated and used by Colonial not as a separate entity but simply
as a name under which Colonial did its business."'36 The court recognized,
however, that it was not applying a simple or mechanical test. Rather,
"[tihe purpose of the court in cases of this nature is to prevent use of the
corporate entity as a cloak for fraud or illegality or to work an injustice, and
that purpose should not be thwarted by adherence to any particular theory of
liability. Colonial was in fact engaged in business in the name of Credit
Plan, and we hold that they are to be regarded as identical for the purpose of
determining whether the present suit is barred by limitation. 37




When all is said and done, in the torts area decisions must rest on notions
of public policy and the willingness of courts to allow corporate businesses to
utilize subsidiaries to immunize a portion of the business assets from claims
of creditors. On the facts of the principal case there seems to be little doubt
that Colonial should have been held liable for unreasonable collection efforts
by the employees whether or not they technically were employees of Credit
Plan since their activities were directed by Colonial; however, this was not
the issue before the court. The issue was whether service of process on
Credit Plan was also service on Colonial, since the statute of limitations had
run and Colonial could not be made the subject of an independent suit.
Presumably there is no question of "fair notice" in these closely intertwined
parent/subsidiary relations; a question legitimately may be raised, however,
whether a mistake by an attorney in failing to name Colonial originally
should be ignored, since, unlike the next cases to be discussed, there does not
appear to be any intentional confusion between the various corporations.
Courts sometimes have stepped in where the names of the related corpora-
tions were very similar and confusion was apt to result, or where the
corporation owning assets was using the name of a corporation without
substantial assets and only the latter was served. We are not given any
information by the court's opinion as to whether or not these factors were
present in this case.
The problem of naming the wrong corporate defendant is particularly
acute where a congery of similarly named corporations exist, and it is
difficult to determine which is the proper defendant. When the wrong
defendant is named, a common defense practice has developed in Texas-
file a general denial, wait until the statute of limitations has run, and then
move for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant is not respon-
sible for the plaintiff's injury.38  Such cases were given a novel twist during
the survey period. In Continental Trailways, Inc. v. Hilland3 9 Hilland sued
"Continental Trailways, Inc." for personal injuries suffered while leaving a
"Continental Trailways" bus eighteen months earlier. It turns out that the
bus was actually operated by "Continental Southern Lines, Inc," and the
corporation named as defendant, "Continental Trailways, Inc.," had no
assets but had been formed solely to retain "Continental Trailways" as a
trade name. A second case, Cohen v. C.H. Leavell & Co., 40 involved
similar facts: in a slip-and-fall case, the attorney for the plaintiff checked the
filings under the assumed name statute for the true name of the entity
operating under the name "Kern Plaza" (the shopping center where plain-
tiff's injuries occurred), and brought suit precisely in the form set forth in the
certificate-C.H. Leavell & Co., Inc. After the statute of limitations had
run it turned out that before the accident the property had been transferred
38. In addition to the cases discussed below, the same pattern appears in the Allright
parking lot cases discussed in the last Annual Survey. See Hamilton, Corporations, An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 146, 157 (1975).
39. 516 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Hilland, 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975).
40. 520 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
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through several related corporations, and was no longer owned by "C.H.
Leavell & Co., Inc." Both courts held that the plaintiff could amend its
pleadings to substitute the name of the correct corporate defendant even
though the statute of limitations had run, relying on rule 28 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule was amended in 1970 to read: "Any
partnership, unincorporated association, private corporation, or individual
doing business under an assumed name may sue or be sued in its partner-
ship, assumed or common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it
a substantive right, but on a motion by any party or on the court's own
motion the true name may be substituted. ' 41 The argument for applying
this provision to the case before it is succinctly stated by the Houston court in
Continental Trailways:
In the case before this Court the appellee's original petition charged
Continental Trailways, Inc. with negligently causing physical harm to
the plaintiff. The petition gave the relevant information indicating the
time, place and circumstances of the injury. It is undisputed that Con-
tinental Trailways, Inc. was nothing but the corporate vehicle for the
trade name "Continental Trailways" under which the appellant Conti-
nental Southern Lines, Inc. did business. The effect of the first peti-
tion was suit against the entity doing business as 'Continental Trailways'
which was responsible for the alleged injury. Sufficient facts were al-
leged by the appellee to enable Continental Trailways, Inc. to identify
the responsible corporation as Continental Southern Lines, Inc., and
the appellant did not show that any significant hardship would result
from allowing the appellee to amend her petition and to proceed.
In amending Rule 28 the Supreme Court recognized the injustice
which results from allowing the responsible corporate entity to lay be-
hind the log until the statute of limitations has run. The ever increas-
ing utilization of a single trade name by a multitude of independently
owned corporations has made it necessary for courts to look behind
the facade of corporate entities and to determine who is in the better
position to ferret out the responsible party. Rule 28 allows the injured
party to sue the obvious entity, the trade name, and thereby toll the
statute pending the discovery of the particular corporate entity that
should ,be sued. It ends the practice which allowed the shell company,
such as Continental Trailways, Inc., to file a general denial and then
to wait until the statute had run before disclaiming responsibility and
pointing a finger at the corporation actually responsible. 42
The El Paso court's decision in Cohen followed shortly after Continental
Trailways was decided, and relied primarily on that case.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the decision in Continental Trail-
ways, but in doing so, opened up other avenues. The court held, alterna-
tively, that the plaintiff could not take advantage of rule 28 because as a
technical matter the named defendant was "Continental Trailways, Inc.," not
"Continental Trailways" which was the assumed or common name, and that
the amended rule 28 did not apply because the accident occurred long before
41. TEX. R. Civ. P. 28.
42. 516 S.W.2d at 281.
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the amendment to rule 28 became effective. The court then added the
following paragraphs describing the scope of its remand:
While there is no evidence here that the bus companies involved set
about to deprive anyone of his or her rights, it is apparent that they
have made a conscious effort to make it appear to the public and to
their customers that they are 'Continental Trailways.' There is evidence
that the corporations have the same agent for service; and it developed
on the oral argument that they use the same attorneys in this area,
at least in Houston. There was also some indication on oral argument
that the service of citation may have actually been forwarded to Conti-
nental Southern Lines, Inc., but there was no indication as to when
this may have occurred. The driver of the bus from which plaintiff
fell, soon after the accident, filled out a report of the accident and
sent it to his home office, the office of the 'real defendant,' Continental
Southern Lines, Inc. From the above it might be inferred that its peo-
ple became alerted and that its investigative people had prompt notice
of the accident. Upon a retrial, the plaintiff will also have the oppor-
tunity to prove, if she can, that with knowledge of the facts of the
accident, Continental Southern Lines, Inc., caused an answer to be filed
by Continental Trailways, Inc., or acquiesced in such action. The rec-
ord, however, was not fully developed; and there are only inferences,
but no finding, that Continental Southern Lines, Inc., was actually noti-
fied and had a fair opportunity to defend itself before the period of
limitations had run.
The primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to compel the exer-
cise of a right within a reasonable time so that the opposite party has
a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available and the evi-
dence is -fresh in their minds. While the plaintiff made a mistake in
her original petition ,as to the defendant that should have 'been sued,
it is our opinion that she should be given, under the circumstances here
present, an opportunity to prove that the Continental Southern Lines,
Inc., was cognizant of the facts, was not misled, or placed at a disad-
vantage in obtaining relevant evidence to defend the suit ...
If the substance of the facts set out above are found upon a new
trial, it would 'be a misapplication of the statute of limitations to hold
that the plaintiff's action was barred. Continental Southern would then
have known or should have known that it would be the target if plain-
tiffs ever learned the new facts, and it had as much opportunity to
prepare a defense as if it had been named a defendant in the original
petition.43
In the future it would be prudent for plaintiffs routinely to name "the
common or assumed name" as well as the corporate defendant they believe
to be responsible for the property causing the injury. It is a reasonable
inference from the Texas Supreme Court's opinion that such plaintiffs may
take advantage of the amended rule 28 in the event it turns out that they did
not name the proper defendant. Also, the policy justification underlying the
statute of limitations, as described by the supreme court's instructions on
remand, would appear to have broad application, largely eliminating any
need to rely on the "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine in these mistaken
43. 528 S.W.2d at 830-31.
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defendant cases. The common defense tactic of "laying behind the log"
appears to be effectively foreclosed in the future.
A questionable application of the piercing the corporate veil doctrine
appears in the Fifth Circuit decision in National Marine Service, Inc. v. C.J.
Thibodeaux & Co.,44 at least if the rather sketchy facts set forth in the
opinion do not omit additional relevant information. It appears that C.J.
Thibodeaux and Company was a substantial business that desired to expand
into the business of shipowning and operating. Thibodeaux hesitated to do
so openly because it would then be competing directly with its regular
customers. A tug, the "Grand Lake," was purchased by Thibodeaux in the
name of a new corporation, The Prairie Company; after a couple of
transfers, title to the boat ended up in the name of a partnership composed
of Thibodeaux and two individuals. The boat was chartered to a nominally
capitalized corporation, River Gulf Corporation, all the stock of which was
owned by an employee of Thibodeaux. A posted notice in the wheelhouse
stated that the owner of the vessel was The Prairie Company, and that the
charterer, River Gulf, pursuant to the charter, did not have authority to incur
liens upon the vessel. The "Grand Lake" put into plaintiff's, National
Marine's, shipyard for repairs ordered by an employee of River Gulf. Upon
failure to receive payment, plaintiff wrote the president of River Gulf, who
replied that he was expecting an insurance payment and asked that a letter
be sent from the plaintiff to the insurance carrier. When nothing further
happened, the plaintiff filed suit against River Gulf and brought a libel
against the "Grand Lake." The boat, however, had burned and sunk.
Therefore, while the plaintiff obtained judgment against River Gulf by
default, that judgment was valueless. Applying maritime law, the trial court
concluded that Thibodeaux was liable for the repairs. 45  The court pointed
out that the relationship between River Gulf, The Prairie Company, and
Thibodeaux was not arm's-length and that the defendants were undoubtedly
aware that repairs were being made. The court concluded, "the vessel
owner was the real beneficiary" of the repairs, and defendants' "use of a
paper corporation to accomplish a purpose they were unwilling to do openly,
with the acknowledged need to keep the vessel in commerce" was sufficient
to make them liable for the repairs. 46  The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the
basis of the district court's analysis, adding that River Gulf was "an
operating arm" of Thibodeaux and that River Gulf's corporate veil was
"diaphanous. '47 In response to the argument that no fraud was shown, the
court of appeals stated that fraud "is not a prerequisite to [piercing the
corporate veil], especially where there is gross undercapitalization or com-
plete domination of the corporate entity under scrutiny. '48
With respect, such justifications for the result are not satisfactory. The
district court's analysis of the facts convincingly indicates that Thibodeaux's
44. 501 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. National Marine Serv., Inc. v. C.J. Thibodeaux & Co., 380 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. 380 F. Supp. at 1080.
47. 501 F.2d at 943.
48. Id. at 942.
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responsible officers must have known of the repairs to the "Grand Lake" at
the time they were made. Presumably, Thibodeaux thereby assented to the
imposition of a lien despite the wheelhouse notice (of which plaintiff was
apparently unaware). These facts also might justify a recovery in quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment. However, the court's conclusion to "pierce
the corporate veil" because the relationship between River Gulf and Prairie
Company was not at arm's length (which also seems irrefutable since
valuable property was turned over to a nominally-capitalized corporation
without consideration) is hard to justify. So far as the plaintiff is concerned,
nearly $20,000 of repairs were made on a vessel without making investiga-
tion into its ownership or asking who was to pay for the repairs. The
plaintiff was unaware of the defendants' interest in the vessel until after suit
was begun.49  Why would a shipyard do this? I assume the explanation lies
in plaintiff's reliance on either the availability of insurance or its power to
impose a lien on the vessel, which obviously was worth much more than the
cost of the repairs. To permit recovery against the defendants seems to give
the plaintiff a windfall that is not justified on the reasoning of the courts.
The concept of the separate existence of a corporation can have an
unexpected bite. In Mendenhall v. Fleming Co.50 two shareholders, the
owners of all the stock in a corporation operating two food stores, brought
suit for violation of the antitrust laws against the corporation's lessor and
supplier of groceries. In essence, the complaint stated that the restrictive
agreements imposed by the defendants violated the antitrust laws and
materially reduced the value of the plaintiff's stock. This was evidenced,
the plaintiffs argued, by the difference between two- offers made by third
parties for the stock, one free of the restrictive agreements (which fell
through when the defendants refused to relinquish their rights under the
agreements) and the other, smaller offer, subject to the restrictive agree-
ments, which the plaintiffs accepted.
Relying on two earlier holdings, 51 the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to pursue the antitrust violations since the claim belonged to
the corporation as an entity, rather than the shareholders personally. 52 The
economic harm to the plaintiffs was "indirect to and duplicative of" the
corporation's right of action. 53 While this analysis makes sense as an
abstract matter of corporate principle, it is not without some difficulty.
Since the purchasers of all the corporate stock presumably paid fair value
for it, a suit by the corporation itself might be met with the argument that
under equitable principles the corporation should be viewed as representing
the purchasers, and to permit corporate recovery would give the purchasers a
windfall.5 4
49. Id. As indicated above, a default judgment had been obtained against River
Gulf, and only after that judgment proved uncollectable did plaintiff learn that defend-
ants might be liable for the repairs.
50. 504 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1957); Peter v. Western Newspaper
Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953).
52. 504 F.2d at 881-82.
53. Id. at 881.
54. This argument could be predicated on the United States Supreme Court decision
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Authority of Officers. The authority of a president of a corporation to act
with directoral approval continues to create problems for Texas courts. The
general position taken by the courts is that a president has no actual or
apparent authority to bind the corporation merely because of his position.55
Such authority, however, may be found in statutes, bylaws, or appropriate
actions taken by directors, including implied authorization and ratification.
In one recent case, Ennis Business Forms, Inc. v. Todd,56 the president of
a corporation agreed that if an employee would remain on the job, $200 per
month would be set aside to be paid to him after the termination of his
employment. The employee in question had been ineligible to participate in
the corporation's retirement plan when first employed by the corporation.
The promise allegedly was made, when the plaintiff was sixty-nine years
old, in connection with an increase in the plaintiff's salary dictated by the
fact that a much younger man was being employed at a higher salary than
the plaintiff's. 57 The court concluded that the president was authorized to
make such a promise on two grounds. First, it relied on the bylaws of the
corporation which authorized the president to be "the chief administrative
officer of the corporation" and gave him the power to enter into "other
contracts of the corporation in the ordinary course of the business of the
company."5' S  Second, the court relied upon prior practice within the
corporation, whereby the president had established salaries for a number of
employees, without objection by the board, and had granted raises when
people threatened to leave the employment of the corporation. The presi-
dent testified he did not believe that this particular promise was significantly
different from promises for increased compensation made to those other
employees. This prior practice would justify an inference that the board had
impliedly authorized such promises. On the other hand, in Siboney Corp. v.
Dresser Industries, Inc.,59 a contracts case, the court refused to hold a
parent corporation (Siboney) liable for the debts of a subsidiary where it
was shown that each corporation had different officers and the parent
exercised no control over the subsidiary's routine business transactions. The
subsidiary was not formed or operated for any illegal, improper, or fraudulent
purpose, the court argued, and there were no representations, statements,
or guarantees by the parent. The most difficult facts from the defendant's
standpoint were that the business of the subsidiary at one time had been
operated as a division of the parent, and the merchandise sold by the plaintiff
on open account was billed as follows:
in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Arroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974),
although the case is distinguishable since the corporation in Bangor was suing the former
owner of its stock rather than third persons.
55. See HAMILTON § 585.
56. 523 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
57. The court did not find it necessary to consider whether the promise to pay what
was in essence a pension was ordinary or extraordinary. For a thoughtful discussion
of the authority to make such promises and distinguishing them from promises of life-
time employment (usually considered extraordinary in nature) see Lee v. Jenkins Bros.,
268 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959).
58. 523 S.W.2d at 86.
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The court held that this did not establish actual or apparent authority on the
part of the subsidiary to bind the parent. Even though this information
"generally came from the customer," the court pointed out there was no
evidence that Siboney authorized or permitted the subsidiary to represent
itself as a division of Siboney.
In still another case 6° the plaintiff advanced between $16,000 and
$18,000 to a corporation through the corporate president. These amounts
were actually received, retained, and used by the corporation without
authorization of the board of directors. When the board learned that the
checks had been received, it recognized these loans on the basis of a report
of an auditor. The court held that the corporation could not deny liability
because the board of directors had "ratified" the transactions. The same
case also involved a check given by the plaintiff to a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the corporation. The court concluded that the defendant was
liable for this obligation also, since it so "dominated" the subsidiary corpora-
tion "that the ultimate benefits went to the parent corporation."'' 1  It is
unclear what theory the court adopted when it made these rather ambiguous
statements. The conclusions seem reasonable under a theory of unjust
enrichment. 62
Because of the unsatisfactory nature of the case law in most states with
respect to the authority of corporate officers and directors, the practice is
widespread in Texas and elsewhere of requiring the corporation to supply a
certified copy of a resolution of its board of directors authorizing the specific
transaction. Of course as a practical matter, in many closely held corpora-
tions directors rarely or never meet. Business decisions are made by the
shareholders-the real parties in interest-and corporate formalities are
ignored. In many instances certified copies of resolutions are supplied even
though no meetings were held. This is usually felt to be irrelevant, however,
on the theory that certification of corporate records is within the secretary's
express authority and the corporation is estopped to deny the validity of the
certification. 63 This view is strongly supported by a case arising within the
survey period. In Diamond Paint Co. v. Embry 4 the court rejected an
60. Beef Indus., Inc. v. Bruer, 516 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no
writ).
61. Id.at 721.
62. See also Acoustical Screens in Color, Inc. v. T.C. Lordon Co., 524 S.W.2d 346
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the court permitted a person con-
tributing money to a corporation in contemplation of acquiring stock in that corporation
to recover it back on the theory of money had and received when the agreement on the
purchase of the stock fell through. In such cases several possible theories authorizing
recovery may be available.
63. HAMILTON § 583. Indeed, on this theory it is a serious mistake to delve further
than the certificate since to do so may uncover information that will destroy the estop-
pel. 64. 525 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1976]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
argument that the execution of a corporate guarantee of the indebtedness of
another was unauthorized on the ground that a certified resolution authoriz-
ing the officer to execute the guarantee was binding on the corporation. The
court stated:
This resolution is attacked . . . as hearsay. We agree with appellees'
contention that the resolution is not hearsay as it was an operative act
of the corporation creating express authority. . . . Latner (the Secre-
tary of the Corporation) had the actual authority to certify copies of
Board resolutions. It is elementary that a corporation is estopped from
denying the representations of -an agent made within the scope of au-
thority. . . . As [the corporation] is estopped to deny the representa-
tion by Latner (its secretary) in the certificate, there was express au-
thority for the execution of the guaranty. 65
While most commentators had stated that this was the Texas law, it is
heartening to have a square judicial holding to this effect.
Officer Liability for Corporate Obligations. As described in the last Annual
Survey, it is important for corporate officers to execute corporate documents
in such a form as to indicate they are acting as agents and not personally. 66
Such executions usually involve transactions not reviewed by an attorney.
Two such cases arose during the current survey period. In Tomlin v. Ceres
Corp.67 the court held the following form of execution to be ambiguous:
Dated: 10th of November, 1966
[Signature of Mitchell T. Curtis]
Mitchell T. Curtis




Attest: Melvin H. Brown
Melvin H. Brown, Asst. Secy. 68
Since it was ambiguous, the court permitted parol testimony to be introduced
as to the intention of the parties; the trial judge chose to believe that only a
corporate execution was intended, a finding which could not be held to be
clearly erroneous.
In a similar case arising in state court6 9 a contract to remodel a house
stated in the body of the contract that the contractor was "Peachtree
Builders, Inc." in conspicuous, large print. However, in the space for the
signature, the President of Peachtree Builders, R.D. 'Robertson, signed his
own name on a line above the word "Contractor." The name "Peachtree
Builders, Inc." did not appear either above or below the signature nor was
there any indication that Robertson was signing as agent rather than as
65. Id. at 534.
66. Hamilton, supra note 38, at 153-54.
67. 507 F.2d 642 (5thCir. 1975).
68. Id. at 645.




principal. The trial court concluded that the contract was ambiguous,
admitted parol testimony as to the parties' intention, and held Robertson
personally liable. In a debatable decision, the court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that the trial court's finding was against the great weight of
the evidence, that the contract purported to be that of the corporation, and
that there was no showing that Robertson had pledged his own responsibility
or personally guaranteed the performance by the corporation. It is clear
from the facts set forth in the court's opinion that there was little respect for
the legal distinction between Robertson and his corporation. For example,
Robertson was introduced as the "contractor" and when asked about a credit
check on "Peachtree Builders" one of the plaintiffs responded that the Better
Business Bureau "did not give us any adverse comment about Mr. Robert-
son. '' 70 In such circumstances, the decision of the trier of fact would seem
to be supportable no matter which way it comes out. The court of civil
appeals seemed to give undue weight to a printed reference in the body of
the contract as to the identity of the "Contractor" despite the fact that the
form of execution strongly suggests that an individual liability may have
been contemplated.
The Saga of Salgo. Salgo v. Matthews,71 discussed at length in an earlier
article, 72 involved an unusual proxy fight in 1972 apparently controlled
solely by state law. In that case the trial court had found for the "non-
management" faction and had issued a permanent injunction in their favor.
Apparently, the order was not stayed since the corporation was turned over
to that faction. The court of civil appeals found basically in favor of the
"management" faction, overturned the permanent injunction and rendered a
judgment "dismissing the action and restoring the parties to the status
existing when the suit was filed."73 However, the successful attorney
learned that it was one thing to win in the court of civil appeals and quite a
different thing to effectuate the victory by resuming control of the corpora-
tion.
The attorney first filed a "motion to enforce mandate" in the trial court,
seeking an order to enjoin the "non-management" faction from refusing to
relinquish the positions on the board of directors. When the trial court
refused he sought mandamus,74 but lost because the 1972 meeting had never
been completed and, thus, it was premature simply to order the "manage-
ment" candidates for director to be elected. The attorney then tried again:
He asked that the pre-meeting board of directors be restored to control so
that they could cause the meeting to be completed. The "non-management"
faction defended on the ground that the request was moot: After the mandate
had been handed down in the original appeal, they had secretly and without
notice to the plaintiff or his attorney completed the election, and lo and
70. Id. at 679.
71. 497 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporation Law-Part 1, 28 Sw. L.J.
641, 684-92 (1975).
73. 497 S.W.2d at 631.
74. Salgo v. Hoffman, 515 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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behold, the "non-management" faction had won after all, thereby mooting
the request to restore the pre-meeting directors. This rather brazen defense
was unexpectedly successful,75 the court arguing that the original order was
"negative" not affirmative, that the "management" faction could not get such
relief because the plaintiff had not "proved" that an attempt to restore the
former board would have been unsuccessful, and because essential parties
were absent-the members of the pre-meeting board and the members of the
board supposedly elected by the "non-management" faction after they
obtained control of the corporation in compliance with the earlier court
mandate. All of this was too much for Justice Williams:
I must respectfully dissent. This litigation has traversed a long and
rocky road and it is high time that it should be brought to an end.
I can easily share the frustration of the petitioners Salgo, et al, when
they hear the majority of this court tell them that we cannot order
the trial court to do that which is necessary to be done in order to
enforce our original decree. In our original judgment, . . . we specifi-
cally, clearly and unequivocally said that the contention made by Salgo,
et al, was correct and that the injunction which had been issued by
the trial court was void and should be vacated. But we did not stop
there. We also decreed in plain and unequivocal language that 'judg-
ment is here rendered dismissing the action and restoring the parties
to the status existing when the suit was filed.' Again, we did not stop
with such statement. In our mandate directed to the trial court we
directed such court to issue such writs and processes as would be neces-
sary to carry out and enforce the judgment of this court. Now, after
properly asking the trial court to do what we had said ought to be done
and to restore the parties to the same status that existed at the time
the erroneous injunction was issued, and being denied such relief, Salgo
seeks relief from us asking that we do nothing more than to undo that
which the trial court should not have done in the first place. In reply
to this plea the majority has now, for the first time, said that we cannot
grant the relief sought because our original judgment was negative and
not affirmative. Faced with this situation I can join with Salgo, et
al, and with the prophet Jeremiah in lamenting: 'Is there no balm
in Gilead?'76
While the enforcement of a court order is a question of procedure rather
than substantive corporation law, it is important to recognize the tremendous
advantage that control of the corporate machinery gives. For example, in
this case there were original proxies and ballots cast at a meeting in 1972;
these papers are totally in the control of the "non-management" faction, and
indeed their continued physical existence is a matter of judgment for that
faction. To this writer, at least, the court of civil appeals did not seem to
appreciate the difficulty of ousting entrenched management or the fact that
time is an ally of those in control who continue to enjoy the fruits of that
control. Apparently, the only remedy the victorious faction has, as a result
of the refusal of the court to enforce that victory, is the institution of another
independent law suit, naming all the former and putative directors as parties,
75. Salgo v. Hoffman, 521 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
76. Id. at 928 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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in an effort to restore the former board. If the mootness defense can be
overcome (which is probably likely given the secret nature of the alleged
meeting), the ballots can be counted (if they still exist) and the victorious
faction will be restored to control. Given inevitable appeals and delays, it is
possible that the victorious faction will be installed in another year or so.
Obviously, there is not much "balm" in the Texas court of civil appeals in
Dallas.
Corporate Guaranties of the Indebtedness of Others. As has been described
in earler Annual Surveys and other sources, 77 before 1973 the Texas law
with respect to the enforcibility of corporate guarantees of the indebtedness
of others was unsatisfactory. In 1973 the state legislature passed statutes
dealing with the enforcibility of corporate guarantees, broadly validating
them. 78  In Diamond Paint Co. v. Embry79 the court largely straightened
out the pre-1973 uncertainties in this area in a satisfactory manner. First
the court held that a corporate guarantee of the indebtedness of another was
not "illegal." In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Whitten
case 80 as indicating that corporate guarantees were at most ultra vires. The
court stated that the 1973 amendment, while hardly conclusive, "is indicative
of the trend of public policy from 1963 to the present to increasingly
sanction corporate guaranties and to ease restriction against them."' s  Fur-
ther, the court held that even if the guarantee were ultra vires, article 2.04 of
the Texas 'Business Corporation Act precludes the corporation from attacking
the guarantee on that basis.8 2 Finally the court was faced with the claim by
the sole shareholder of the guaranteeing corporation that it had the right to
enjoin the guarantee under article 2.04B(1), which permits the defense of
ultra vires to be asserted:
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to
enjoin the doing of any act or acts or the transfer of real or personal
property by or to the corporation. If the unauthorized act or transfer
sought to be enjoined is 'being, or is to be, performed or made pursu-
ant to any contract to which the corporation is a party, the court may,
if all of the parties to the contract are parties to the proceeding and
if it deems the same to be equitable, set aside and enjoin the perform-
ance of such contract, and in so doing may allow to the corporation
or to the other parties to the contract, as the case may be, compensation
for the loss or damage sustained by either of them which may result
77. The history and development of this troublesome problem is described in Lebo-
witz, supra note 72, at 655-62. See also HAMILTON § 360.
78. This legislation took the form of an amendment to TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1302-2.06 (Supp. 1975-76), and is discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 72, at 655-62.
79. 525 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
81. 525 S.W.2d at 535.
82. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 2.04 (1956) provides in part that ultra vires may
not be asserted to invalidate an "act of a corporation" or "a conveyance or transfer of
real or personal property to or by a corporation" except in three specified circumstances:
(1) a shareholder proceeding to enjoin a corporate action; (2) a corporate proceeding
or shareholder derivative suit against officers or directors for exceeding their authority;
and (3) an attorney general proceeding either to dissolve the corporation, enjoin the
transaction of unauthorized business, or enforce divestment of property held or acquired
contrary to law. See HAMILTON § 352.
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from the action of the court in setting aside and enjoining the perform-
ance of such contract, but anticipated profits to be derived from the
performance of the contract shall not be awarded by the court as a
part of loss or damage sustained. 88
The court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
refusing to grant an injunction under this provision. The court pointed out
that the shareholder had become such after the guarantee had been issued
and that "undoubtedly" the shareholder's officers and directors were aware
of the existence of the guarantee before purchasing the company. The court
further pointed out that the shareholder's officers and directors, while they
may have been "only haphazardly" informed about the guarantee, had made
no investigation and had elected to ignore the matter. Under these circum-
stances, the court intimated, not only was the refusal to grant an injunction
not arbitrary, but a decision to grant an injunction would have been
improper.
If other courts follow the approach taken by the court in this case, many
of the doubts, uncertainties, and concerns expressed about the status of the
Texas law of corporate guaranties prior to 1973 will be resolved.
Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Litigation. A continuing problem in share-
holder litigation-both derivative and class-is whether a successful share-
holder-plaintiff may recover his attorneys' fees from the corporation or from
other defendants. There is no problem if there is a statute or an agreement
authorizing the award of such fees; typically, however, there is not, and the
issue comes down to whether the benefit conferred on non-plaintiff share-
holders and the corporation is sufficiently great to justify charging that
benefit with a reasonable attorney's fee. The question has been considered
by the Supreme Court of the United States on several occasions, 8 4 and the
most recent decision-involving environmental litigation rather than share-
holder class or derivative litigation-appears to reflect a more conservative
approach to the award of such fees. 85  The same problem was also
considered by the Texas Supreme Court during the survey period. In
Knebel v. Capital National Bank8 6 devisees under a will successfully
brought suit to set aside a sale by the estate of fifty percent of the stock of a
closely-held corporation. The sale had been made back to the corporation
for about $43,000 pursuant to an option held to be unenforceable because
the other shareholder was also an executor of the estate. s 7  The court
formulated a test for the propriety of awarding attorneys' fees. It stated first
that to charge attorneys' fees requires the existence of a "common fund" and
"[t]he equitable objective is that of distributing the burden of such expenses
83. TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. art. 2.04B(l) (1956).
84. The principal securities case allowing recovery of attorneys' fees even though
there was no monetary recovery is Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
85. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), noted in
29 Sw. L.J. 767 (1975).
86. 518 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1974).




among those who share in an accomplished benefit."88  Further, the benefit
must be "substantial," and, while "bad faith" is not essential, it must be
shown that a refusal to award fees would allow others to obtain "full benefit"
from the plaintiff's efforts, thereby enriching "the others unjustly at the
plaintiff's expense."' 89  A "substantial benefit" usually is, but need not
necessarily be, monetary in nature.
The court had much greater difficulty applying its formulated test to the
facts before it. The result of the litigation was that the estate returned the
purchase price of the stock and received back a fifty percent interest in a
closely held corporation. Estimates of the value of the corporation were
between $600,000 and $730,000. However, an obvious problem existed in
actually realizing the value of the stock, particularly since the other fifty
percent was not in friendly hands. The court discussed the problems thus
created:
As we have noted, 7-Up Bottling Company, Inc. is a closely held
corporation with the Knebel estate and the Respondents owning respec-
tive fifty percent interests. Neither can force the other to sell and nei-
ther has a controlling interest to sell. They have been disputants in
litigation for many years. As to the possible independent sale of the
Knebel estate stock, the witness Sherman acknowledged the difficulty
in selling fifty percent of the stock of a going business; he testified,
'... who's going to put money into something and own only fifty per-
cent of it? They want it all . . . .' He did not purport to place a
fair market value upon the Knebel stock as such. Nor is there evidence
of the liquidation value of the assets of the corporation whether by
agreement or by order of the court. This is pointed out in the brief
of Mrs. A.G. Saegert, et al., appellants in the Court of Civil Appeals
and Petitioners here, where it is stated that the testimony of the witness
Louis Garrett concerning the fair market value of the land owned by
the corporation was the only testimony of the liquidation value of the
assets of the corporation. It is also fair to say that the market value
testimony of the witness Henry H. Kuempel was likewise predicated
upon a sale of the corporation as a going business and was to the same
general effect as the witness Sherman. 90
The court concluded that it was not shown as a matter of law that the
litigation was of substantial benefit to the estate and remanded to the court
of civil appeals to determine whether an "implied finding" of the trial court
that there was no benefit to the estate could be upheld.91 Justice Pope
dissented on the ground that he believed that a "substantial benefit" was
shown by undisputed proof and that, therefore, the proper dispostion was to
remand directly to the trial court for a determination of the reasonable
attorneys' fees. 9 2
88. 518 S.W.2d at 799.
89. Id. at 800.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id. at 804. The court of civil appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
a fact finding on the question of benefit to the estate. Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank,
523 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. 518 S.W.2d at 804 (Pope, J., dissenting).
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Share Transfer Restrictions. The difficult problem of valuing shares of a
closely held corporation is also often involved in option or buy-sell agree-
ments between the corporation and shareholders or among the shareholders
themselves. In such agreements it is customary to provide some test by
which the value can be determined. 93 One case arising during the survey
period94 involved a stock repurchase agreement which provided that upon
the death of a shareholder his estate would receive a price "equal to the
adjusted book value . . . as of the last day of the month preceding [the
shareholder's] death plus a pro rata share of 90 per cent of the accounts
receivable at such time, provided, however, that in the event that the
corporation's certified public accountant determine[d] that such value [was]
less than $70,000.00, the corporation shall be obliged to purchase the shares
of [the deceased shareholder] for the sum of $70,000.00 cash."9 5  The
corporation in this instance carried life insurance on each of the three
shareholders in the face amount of $70,000 each. When the plaintiff's
decedent died, the corporation's certified public accountant valued the
interest pursuant to the agreement at a little over $36,000. As a result the
sum of $70,000 was paid to the decedent's widow. Essentially, three narrow
questions were in dispute. First, a question was raised as to whether the
life insurance policy should be valued at cash surrender value or at maturity
value. The court held that it should be the former (as the CPA had valued
it) because the value was to be determined "as of the last day of the month
preceding the stockholder's death." At that time the policy had not
matured. Second, the court rejected a contention that work in progress but
not yet billed should be valued. The court held that in view of the specified
provision with respect to accounts receivable as of the last day of the month
preceding the date of death, the agreement did not contemplate that any
value was to be placed to work in progress. Finally the court rejected
contentions based on the refusal of the CPA to revalue depreciated physical
assets or deferrals for income tax. While the court expressed reservation
about whether such re-evaluations should be permissible because the agree-
ment specified "adjusted book value" rather than "market value," it found it
unnecessary to pass on this point since even if these re-evaluations were
made the total value of the widow's interest would still be less than
$70,000.DG
In another case involving share transfer restrictions, 9 7 the court refused to
construe a provision stating that a shareholder "will not sell, assign, transfer,
pledge or in any way dispose of or encumber any . . . shares without first
offering . . . the same for sale to the Corporation"9 8 as covering a transfer
to a divorced wife pursuant to a court decree. The court stated that share
93. Such agreements are discussed in HAMILTON §§ 673-83.
94. Garza v. C-G-R, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
95. Id. at 60.
96. Id. at 62.
97. Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1975, no writ).
98. Id. at 201.
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transfer restrictions were not "looked upon with favor in the law" and were
"strictly construed."9 9  While it is unfortunate that such language continues
to reappear in cases, it cannot be denied that the result reached is reasona-
ble. Since the interest of the divorced wife in the shares was a substitute for
her community property interest in the shares owned by her former husband,
she had a continuing property interest and is not a transferee of the same
type as a third person unconnected with the shareholder. Indeed the court
recognized this basic point by quoting from a Louisiana case in which the co-
ownership argument was clearly made. 100
Compelling Transfer of Shares. When shares of stock in a closely held
corporation are transferred to a person deemed antagonistic by management,
the new shareholder may experience difficulty in persuading the corporation
to register the shares in the name of such person. In the case just
discussed, 11' for example, the divorced wife experienced great difficulty in
having the shares awarded her by the divorce court registered in her name.
Eventually, she brought suit for conversion, and, while the court ultimately
reversed a substantial judgment in her favor, it was clear from the opinion of
the court that upon remand a judgment in her favor was likely. A putative
shareholder has a choice of remedies: he may sue for conversion, or he may
request mandamus, injunction, or similar kinds of mandatory relief to compel
registration. The court of appeals defined the circumstances in which a right
to sue for conversion arises: There must be an intention to assert an adverse
right to the property but neither a wrongful, intention nor bad faith is
required. Thus, the fact that the corporation may have relied upon advice
of counsel, or that the officers believed their actions in refusing to transfer
the shares were justified, does not constitute a legal defense to an action for
conversion. However, a qualified refusal based upon a reasonable qualifica-
tion or requirement does not constitute a conversion if the qualified refusal is
made in good faith. In the case under discussion the officers had not flatly
refused to register the transfer, but rather had admitted that Mrs. Earthman
had an interest in the stock. Thus, the failure of the court to instruct the
jury that such a qualified refusal in good faith might be a defense constituted
error. Further, the court stated that it was permissible for corporate officers
to delay a requested transfer for a reasonable period of time in order to
ascertain whether the transfer was authorized or improper. Here, the facts
strongly suggest improper intimidation and threats in an effort to force Mrs.
Earthman to sell her shares to the corporation at a favorable price. The
court of appeals stated that such conduct might permit the award of punitive
or exemplary damages in a stock conversion case, but that it was not proper
to make an independent award for mental anguish as a result of such
99. Id. at 202, citing Gulf States Abrasive Mfg., Inc. v. Oertel, 489 S.W.2d 184
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Casteel v. Gunning, 402
S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ei Paso 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956) (a restriction
cannot negative a wife's present interest as co-owner).
101. Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526 S.W.2d 192, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1975, no writ); see note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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conduct. In other words, an award of punitive damages for such conduct is
dependent upon a determination that a conversion occurred, and an inde-
pendent award for mental suffering in the absence of a finding of conversion
is improper.
Unfair Competition by Former Employees. In the absence of an agreement
restricting competition, former employees or officers of a corporation may
enter into competition with it. In particular, such persons may utilize
general knowledge, skill, and experience required in the former employment
without infringing on the rights of the former employer. However, they may
not use confidential information or trade secrets acquired or imparted to
them in the course of their prior employment. These basic principles were
recognized and applied in Johnston v. American Speedreading Academy,
Inc.10 2 In this case, an injunction prohibiting former employees from
competing with the former corporation was held to be too broad, but
provisions prohibiting solicitation of former customers derived from customer
lists, entering into contracts with customers or prospective customers of the
former employer, and using confidential material obtained from the former
employer were deemed proper. 10 3
Incorporation of a Going Business. Article 2.02 of the Texas Miscellaneous
Corporation Laws Act' 0 4 requires that a notice be published when "any
banking, mercantile or other business firm" incorporates "without a change
of firm name." Further, the last sentence of this article states: "Until such
notice has been so published for the full period above-named, (one day in
each week for four consecutive weeks), no change shall take place in the
liability of such form or the members thereof."'10 5 In Payne v. Lucas'01 the
Houston court of civil appeals reviewed the background of this provision and
the case law that has arisen, and concluded that its protection should be lim-
ited to creditors who had previously dealt with the unincorporated firm. A
creditor who deals only with a corporation has a duty to make reasonable
inquiry as to whom he is dealing with, and cannot hold "the members" per-
sonally liable under article 2.02 unless it "acted in justifiable reliance" upon
a belief that they were liable.' 07 The court described the liability provisions
of article 2.02 as "penal in nature" and concluded, therefore, that its scope
should not be extended beyond the "clear import of its language."' 08 This
"import," the court stated, was to protect persons who relied on the unincor-
porated status of a business and who received no notice that the firm had
incorporated. 10 9 This conclusion, while hardly compelled by the language of
the statute, makes the application of this article much more rational. It is
102. 526 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
103. Id. at 166.
104. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02 (1962).
105. Id.
106. 517 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See also Siboney Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 521 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which follows this case.
107. 517 S.W.2d at 607.
108. Id. at 606.
109. Id. at 607.
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regretable that the Texas Supreme Court declined to review this holding only
on the ground of "no reversible error."
Redeemable Common Shares. Article 4.09 of the Texas 'Business Corpora-
tion Act unambiguously states that "shares shall be redeemable only if they
have a liquidation preference." '1 10 This provision is echoed in article 2.12B,
which authorizes a corporation to issue shares of preferred or special classes
"subject to the right of the corporation to redeem any shares having a
liquidation preference . . . ."" Capital National Bank v. S.E. Realty
Corp.1" 2 involved an action for declaratory judgment seeking to declare in-
valid redemptive provisions relating to a class of shares that were non-voting,
non-cumulative, and without a preference on liquidation. The court read the
statutory language in accordance with its plain meaning and affirmed a
declaratory order that the redemption provision was unenforceable."11
Partnerships. A recurring problem in partnership law is whether an ar-
rangement between two or more persons constitutes a partnership, employ-
ment, or other relationship. Often arrangements are entered into without
legal advice and without consideration of all the consequences of the
arrangement. In Green v. Meadows,' 4 for example, two persons entered
into an arrangement in which one person put up the money, the other person
provided services; profits were to be shared on a basis later to be agreed
upon. An assumed name certificate was filed, stating that the sole owner of
the business "Meadows and Green" was Green; however, the agreement with
the bank opening the checking account of the business was on the bank's
standard form for partnerships and described the depositor as a partnership
between Meadows and Green. In determining that no partnership existed
under these ambiguous circumstances, the court was primarily motivated by
the fact that if the business were considered a partnership, it was in violation
of Treasury Department rules relating to customs brokers, which require that
all members of a partnership be licensed brokers. The case involved
unauthorized withdrawals of money from the business account. Such con-
duct would involve embezzlement if the business were a sole proprietorship
but, arguably, would not be criminal at all if the check writer were a partner,
since most courts adhere to the rule that a partner cannot embezzel funds of
the partnership-an example of the aggregate theory of partnership.11 5
110. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 4.09 (Supp. 1975-76).
111. Id. art. 2.12B.
112. 515 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
113. The court stated: "Where the legislature has acted to define the powers and lim-
itations upon corporate entities generally, its prescription should be strictly pursued."
Id. at 331.
114. 517 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 524 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1975), rehearing denied, 527 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
115. Most of the case law on this proposition is relatively old. See, e.g., Ex parte
Sanders, 23 Ariz. 20, 201 P. 93 (1921); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 982 (1922). The recent
trend of the case law is generally to treat the partnership as a separate entity under the
Uniform Partnership Act, and it is possible that a different view might be taken today.
A case taking this recent approach is People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 519, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973), which overruled earlier California cases
to hold a partner liable for embezzling from his partnership. The district attorney in
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The court, however, did not need to resolve that question squarely in view
of the conclusion that no partnership relation existed.
The Texas Uniform Partnership Act has been in effect for fifteen
years." 6 It is disquieting to see courts decide cases that are clearly
controlled by this statute on the basis of early case law without any apparent
recognition that there may be a relevant statute dealing with the question.
Perhaps this is a result of the fact that much of this statute codifies common
law principles and the result is often the same under the statute or case law.
One such case arose during the survey period. In Boyd v. Leasing
Associates, Inc.' 17 the issue was whether a former partner in a dissolved
partnership was liable for debts incurred by a successor who was operating
the business. Boyd and Nordstrom originally entered into the restaurant
business under the name "Nasa Grill" as a partnership in 1966. Nordstrom
operated the business, while Boyd provided the money. Sometime in 1966
the partnership was dissolved by mutual agreement and the business was
picked up by one Horne, who continued to run the business and make pay-
ments on the various partnership obligations. No notice was given that
Boyd was no longer a partner in the partnership. One of the creditors who
had dealt with "Nasa Grill" was the plaintiff, who leased automobiles or
trucks to the partnership. In connection with this lease, Boyd signed a
"Continuing Guaranty" wherein he guaranteed payment of any claims the
lessee might have on the lease. The suit involved liability for two trucks
leased by Horne after he took over the business. The basic question thereby
raised was whether the subsequent transactions with a creditor of the part-
nership who had no notice of the dissolution "would bind the partnership [as]
if dissolution had not taken place." 118 This in turn requires resolution of the
question whether pursuant to section 9 of the Texas Uniform Partnership
Act, Horne's leasing of the two trucks was "for apparently carrying on in the
usual way the business of the partnership."' 1 9 On the facts there was con-
siderable doubt as to whether the lease of the trucks in question was for
purposes of the partnership business, since the need of a small restaurant for
fairly large trucks is not self-evident. The court reached the conclusion that
the lease was not for the purposes of the partnership business, a proper
result on the facts, but did not mention the appropriate provisions of the
the case under discussion testified that he would not have submitted the case to the grandjury if he had known that the putative embezzler was a partner.
116. The Act was adopted in 1961 and became effective on Jan. 1, 1962.
117. 516 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35(l)(b)(I) (1970) provides in part:
(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership...
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership if dissolution
had not taken place, provided the other party to the transaction (I)
was a creditor of the partnership at the time of dissolution . . . and
• . . had no knowledge or notice of his want of authority.
In the present case, the acts of Horn were attributed to the partnership because, absent
notice, Horn acted as an apparent agent of the partnership.
119. Id. § 9(2) provides that: "An act of a partner which is not apparently for the
carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the part-
nership unless authorized by the other partners." (In the situation of this case, Horn
was considered an apparent agent of the partnership, acting for Boyd.)
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Uniform Partnership Act. Rather, it relied on earlier case law that estab-
lished essentially the same test as the Uniform Act.
A final partnership case also involved partnership liquidation. The issues
were the proper treatment of apparent capital deficits caused by charging
depreciation on improvements to real property solely to the account of one
partner, and whether loans by a partner to the partnership should be treated
as indebtedness or as capital contributions. In Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd
1 20
a carefully drafted limited partnership agreement provided that the limited
partner, the plaintiff corporation, should contribute $100, and the general
partner, Mrs. Byrd, would contribute all additional necessary capital; losses
would be shared "according to actual losses suffered by each party."'
121
Mrs. Byrd contributed capital of over $88,000 and loans of over $1,100,-
000; consistently, all depreciation was charged to her capital account and she
claimed the amounts as tax deductions. The loans were all evidenced by
interest-bearing promissory notes. The combination of putting most of the
capital in as loans and charging all depreciation to her capital account
resulted in an "apparent deficit," but the court held that Mrs. Byrd's estate
need not restore that deficit since it did not reflect any withdrawals by or
distributions to Mrs. Byrd. An earlier case122 which required the restora-
tion of a capital deficit in liquidation was marked by actual distributions to
the partner. While the facts are so peculiar that there may be unforeseen
problems, the result reached does seem to lead to a just and equitable
settlement of partnership relations on the basis of the known facts. While it
is difficult to square it with the literal language of the Uniform Partnership
Act, this augurs few future difficulties as the situation posed appears to be
unique.' 2
3
The conclusion that the loans by Mrs. Byrd should be repaid before any
distributions on account of capital or income seems clearly right; indeed
section 40 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act squarely contemplates that
a partner may also be a creditor to his partnership.
1 24
Foreign Corporations. The Texas Business Corporation Act provisions with
respect to the qualifications of foreign corporations were designed to encour-
age foreign corporations transacting intrastate business to obtain a certificate
of authority; they were not designed to punish corporations who fail to do
120. 522 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ granted). [Editor's
Note: The Texas Supreme Court reversed this case. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 188 (Feb. 21,
1976).]
121. Id.at 574 n.l.
122. Conrad v. Judson, 465 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1971).
123. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 18(1)(a), 40(b) (1970) normally
requires each partner with a deficit in his capital account to contribute to the partner-
ship, since otherwise he will have withdrawn a greater percentage of his capital than he
is entitled to. These provisions, however, may be varied by agreement so far as they
affect relations between the partners themselves, and probably the simplest way to justify
the result under the UPA is to argue that the peculiar provisions of the partnership
agreement show that the parties did agree that Mrs. Boyd's deficit should not be restored.
124. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 40(b)(II) (1970) recognizes obliga-
tions "owing to partners other than for capital and profits." See also Professor Brom-




so.12 5  Thus, article 8.18 of the Texas Business Corporation Act 28
provides that while an unqualified foreign corporation may not maintain an
action, suit, or proceeding in a court of this state, contracts entered into by
an unqualified corporation are not invalid, and a corporation may qualify
and then bring suit on pre-qualification contracts. In one case arising during
the survey period 127 an unqualified foreign corporation brought suit to
enforce a covenant not to compete. Apparently there was some question
about whether the corporation was involved in interstate or intrastate
business. The defendant's counsel was well aware that the plaintiff had not
qualified to transact business in Texas if it were engaged in intrastate
business. However, as a dilatory maneuver, he waited until -the morning of
the trial before calling this fact to the attention of the judge. Rather than
dismissing the proceeding, the judge permitted it to continue. Determining
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, the court reconsidered the
defendant's plea in abatement and granted the plea, but postponed entry of
final judgment for thirty days with the stipulation that if the plaintiff failed to
file a certificate of authority within that thirty-day period the plea in
abatement would be granted; upon filing such a certificate, however, a final
judgment granting a permanent injunction would be entered. Needless to
say, the plaintiff filed the certificate within the thirty-day period. The court
of appeals "commended" the judge for preventing a "dilatory maneuver in a
manner that avoided disruption of the docket, that was fair to both parties
and yet accomplished the purpose of the statute.' 28 Apparently, the judge
had dismissed counsel in other cases in order to permit this trial to proceed
and he was justifiably annoyed when the defendant, on the morning of the
trial, for the first time raised an impediment to the plaintiff's right to
maintain the action.
Interestingly, the plaintiff sought to appeal the order also on the ground
that it should not have been required to file the certificate, even though it
had filed the certificate to avoid the plea in abatement. Of course, such a
filing involves a fee of $500.129 The court, however, refused to consider
this appeal on the ground that it was moot. With the filing of the certificate
no order of the court could affect the corporation's current position.
Receiverships. The Bar Committee Comment to article 7.04 of the Texas
Business Corporation Act states that that article's provisions with respect to
receiverships for corporations should govern rather than the provisions of
article 2293 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 180 One case arising in the
survey period ordered the appointment of a receiver for a corporation under
article 2293 rather than under the Texas Business Corporation Act.' 8' Since
125. See HAMILTON § 987.
126. Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18A (1956).
127. Troyan v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, no writ).
128. Id. at435.
129. Tax. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 10.01A(4) (1956).
130. Id. art. 7.04, Comment.
131. Collegiate Recovery & Credit Assistance Programs, Inc. v. State, 525 S.W.2d 900
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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the provisions of the two statutes are virtually identical, however, there ap-
pears to be little ground for attack based on the improper citation of au-
thority.
In addition to case law concerning receiverships, a receivership problem in
connection with brokerage firms received legislative correction during the
survey period.132
II. SECURITIES REGULATION
Federal. For many years the judicial development of doctrines of federal
corporation and securities law were almost exclusively the province of the
lower federal courts, particularly the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the Second Circuit. The lower federal courts
developed significant new principles under rule lOb-5,1 33 section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,'13 section 14 of the same Act (and the
proxy regulations promulgated thereunder), 135 and, to a somewhat lesser
extent, sections 13 and 14 of that Act relating to tender offers and struggles
for control. 136 Under these provisions literally thousands of lower federal
court decisions, primarily concerning publicly held corporations, developed a
broad (and, until recently, growing) jurisprudence in the federal courts.
A major development in this area in recent years has been the increasing
activism of the United States Supreme Court. This activism has not been
directed towards the broadening of federal jurisdiction; rather, with the more
conservative appointments in recent years, it has strongly tended to limit the
growth of litigation in the federal courts. This trend began prior to the
present survey period, but its outlines became clearer as a result of several
recent decisions. Without summarizing each of these cases at great length, a
listing indicates the extent of the Court's "counter-revolution":
(1) Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.137  In this case the
Court strongly supports the limiting doctrine under rule lOb-5, popularly
known as the Birnbaum doctrine, 13  which states that a plaintiff has
standing under rule lOb-5 only if it is a purchaser or seller of securities.
The majority opinion contains strong criticism of the growth of rule lOb-5
and intimates that this rule may be more narrowly construed in the future.
The opinion also specifically reserves the question whether a plaintiff may
132. See note 204 infra and accompanying text.
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). The proxy regulations appear at 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-1 to -12 (1975).
136. These provisions are usually referred to as the "Williams Act." 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
137. 421 U.S. 723 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 951 (1975).
138. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). The critical language of this case is that rule lob-5 is "directed solely at
that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and
that Rule X-10b-5 [extends] protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller." Id.
at 464. The decision in Blue Chip may undercut to some extent the expansionist hold-
ing in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). For an
attempt to rationalize these cases, see Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc.,
524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975).
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proceed at all under the more generous provisions of rule 10b-5 when the
basis of his complaint is misrepresentation or non-disclosure in an offering
that is subject to registration under the Securities Act of 1933.139
(2) Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.140  This case holds that a failure
to file under the Williams Act may not be used to support an injunction
prohibiting the voting of shares if the failure to file has since been correct-
ed.'41
(3) United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.142  The holding in
this case was that shares issued by a cooperative housing corporation were
not "securities" for purposes of the federal securities laws.
(4) Securities Investor Protection 'Corp. v. Barbour.143 In this case the
Court held that a customer of a broker does not have an implied or private
cause of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act. 144
(5) Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. 145
This case holds that after a person purchases ninety-eight percent of the
stock of a corporation, both the purchaser and the corporation are precluded
from suing the sellers for alleged corporate mismanagement occurring before
the sale.
In contrast to the above decisions restricting the availability of rule 10b-5
for purposes of litigation, jurisdictional requirements have become increasing-
ly liberal. During the survey period the Fifth Circuit joined an increasing
number of circuits in holding that the jurisdictional requirements of rule 1 Ob-5
may be met by a single intrastate telephone call.' 46
The question of whether suits brought under rule 10b-5147 in Texas are
controlled by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in the Texas
Securities Act 48 or the two-year statute applicable to frad,' 49 including
violations of section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, 150 is
not completely settled. Early case law indicated that the shorter statute
would be applied,'"' but one federal district court' 152 held that the three-
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
140. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
141. In this case, Rondeau purchased more than 5% of the outstanding Mosinee
stock without filing the statement required by 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). When
advised of this violation, he promptly filed the certificate. Even though he was then
in compliance, the corporation sought to use the violation as a basis for enjoining him
from voting the stock and acquiring additional stock.
142. 421 U.S. 837 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 987 (1975).
143. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
144. 15 U.S.C. H8 78aaa-lll (1970).
145. 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
146. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1975). For examples of the same
position in other circuits see Spilker v. Shayne Laboratories, Inc., 520 F.2d 523, 526 (9th
Cir. 1975); Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 503 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1974);
Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). Although the court in
Dupuy cites the Ninth Circuit as having adopted a contrary position in Burke v. Triple
A Mach. Shop, Inc., 438 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit, three months
after the decision in Dupuy, distinguished and narrowly construed Burke in Spilker v.
Shayne Laboratories, Inc., supra, at 525.
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
148. TEX. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33C (1964).
149. Id. art. 5526.
150. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (1968).
151. See, e.g., Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1971).
152. Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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year statute should govern. During the survey period, the Second Circuit,
applying Texas law in a suit transferred from the Northern District of Texas
by the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 1, 3 carefully re-examined the ques-
tion, and also concluded that the three-year statute of the Texas Securities
Act should be applied by analogy. The test, according to the court, "is to
compare the state causes of action to a rule 10b-5 action and to choose the
statute of limitations applicable to that state cause of action which is most
similar to the federal cause of action under rule lOb-5 and which best
effectuates the rule's purpose.' 54
In another rule lob-5 case arising during the survey period, the Fifth
Circuit considered whether a Texas divorce settlement involving shares of
stock constitutes a "sale" or "disposition." While the court strongly intimat-
ed that a transfer of stock in settlement of community property claims
followed by the prompt re-purchase of that stock by the corporation might
well constitue a "sale" of the stock for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction
under rule lOb-5, it did not definitively so hold;155 rather, it concluded that
it was improper to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on summary judgment.
The court stated:
The precise nature of Spector's interest in the 40 BME shares registered
in his wife's name is a matter governed by Texas property law and
is not now before us. Suffice it to say, however, that the plaintiff has
alleged facts which. . . support a finding that the 40 shares were com-
munity property and that before the divorce settlement Spector individu-
ally owned an interest in at least some of them, notwithstanding that
the shares were registered in his wife's name.' 56
The non-disclosure involved in the Spector case was a failure fully to
disclose plans for a public offering by the corporation of the stock being
purchased from the husband.
There was also litigation between securities firms and their customers
during the survey period. One case held that where a margined account is
"under water," the broker cannot be held liable for failing to mitigate
damages if he carries the customer for a period of time and the stock
declines further. "[T]he customary practice in the industry," the court
stated, "is to give the customer every benefit of the doubt and to accept the
customer's check in good faith.' 57 The case also involved a lack of good
faith by the customer in that he knowingly gave the broker checks when
there were not sufficient funds on deposit to cover them. A second case
held that an agreement between a sophisticated customer and brokerage firm
to arbitrate all disputes was unenforceable to the extent that it required
arbitration of claims based on violations of the federal and state securities
153. Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975).
154. Id. at 407. The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, in part
on the ground that the action was barred even under the three-year statute.
155. Spector v. L Q Motors Inns, Inc., 517 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975).
156. Id. at 284-85.
157. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. D & G Supply & Maintenance Co.,
390 F. Supp. 715, 719 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
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acts.'"" The holding of Wilko v. Swan1 59 was held to cover sophisticated as
well as unsophisticated directors.
State. A decision of some practical importance in the allocation of litigation
between the Texas Securities Commission and the courts is D & S Invest-
ments, Inc. v. Mouer,160 holding that the commissioner has primary jurisdic-
tion to determine whether or not certain sales of real property by a joint
venture arrangement constitute the sale of a "security." The concept of
primary jurisdiction relates to whether the court or the agency should decide
a question in the first instance; it seems clear that as a matter of economy
and efficiency, such questions should first be considered by the commission-
er. Further, there is specific statutory language within the Securities Act
which recognizes the power of the commissioner to resolve such issues' 61
and provides for judicial review from the administrative decision.' 62
The definition of a private offering in the Texas Securities Act combines a
numerical requirement with the requirement that the sale be "made without
any public solicitation or advertisements .... ,,163 While the concept of a
"public advertisement" creates no difficulty, some uncertainty has existed as
to what constitutes a "public solicitation" and how such a "solicitation"
differs from a "public advertisement." -In a criminal case arising during this
survey'6 4 a court held that the following facts were sufficient to permit the
issue of what is a "public solicitation" to be submitted to a jury: First, the
defendant had approached persons at such places as delicatessens; second,
the defendant had shown a number of graphs and charts concerning stocks
and bonds to various persons in an effort to induce people to invest in a
"joint venture" in which the defendant was investing funds for others; and
third, the defendant had exhibited his graphs and charts to at least thirteen
persons, each of whom ultimately invested money in this scheme. While the
opinion does not attempt to define "public solicitation," the above facts
appear to constitute a public solicitation as that phrase is normally under-
stood. The court also concluded that the joint venture being pushed by the
defendant constituted the sale of a security, and a prison term was imposed,
as well as a fine of $1,000.
Finally, during the survey period, an interesting case arose involving the
difference between the record date and ex-payment date for the payment of
a dividend or interest on a security. Fox and Kiser owned some registered
six-and-one-half percent bonds issued by Trans World Airlines. TWA had
158. Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
159. 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (an arrangement to arbitrate disputes between a customer
and a brokerage firm constitutes a "stipulation" to waive compliance with any "provi-
sion" of the Securities Act of 1933 and, thus, was in violation of the Securities Act of
1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970)).
160. 521 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-24 (1964). As the court noted in the prin-
cipal case, other persons had gone to the commissioner to seek an order that the interests
they proposed to sell did not constitute "securities." Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis,
Inc. v. Mouer, 520 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
162. TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-27 (1964).
163. Id. art. 581-5(I).
164. Cox v. State, 523 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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not made the two previous semi-annual payments and, as a result, the bonds
were traded "flat," that is without any accrual of interest between payment
dates, much as though they were shares of stock rather than debt securities.
In 1972 TWA announced it would make the regular interest payment on
June 1, 1972, "to bondholders of record on May 19, 1972," and, at the same
time, would make up the missed interest payments. Fox and Kiser decided
that the most profitable course would be to sell the bonds on the first day
they could do so and yet retain the interest payment. They inquired of their
broker, E.F. Hutton & Company, as to what day that would be, and the
Dallas office of Hutton contacted the New York office, which advised them
as follows: "Transworld Air--Record Dte on TWA 6 1/2 is May 19.
"Owner Could sell Bonds. May 20 and Still get Arrearage." This
information was wrong. The record date simply establishes to whom a
payment is made; as between buyer and seller of securities entitlement to a
payment is based on the "ex" date. If a sale is made before the "ex-
payment" or "ex-dividend" date, the buyer is entitled to the payment; if
made after that date, the seller receives the payment. 16 5 Since the TWA
bonds were traded "flat" the "ex" date is the date of the payment itself, so
that the first day Fox and Kiser could have sold the bonds and retained the
interest was June 2.160
Acting on this erroneous information, Fox and Kiser sold their bonds on
May 22 and later, learning that they were not entitled to the interest
payment, sued the broker for that payment. The trial court entered
judgment for the amount of the payment, but the court of appeals re-
versed.' 6 7 While the court's opinion expresses doubt whether brokers'
customers should be permitted to recover under such circumstances on
theories of reliance or promissory estoppel, its reversal was apparently
based primarily on the incorrect measure of damages. Before the ex-
payment date the price of the TWA bonds clearly reflected the right to
receive the payments. Between May 19 and June 1 the price of the bonds
fluctuated in the 93-95 range (from $930 to $950 for a $1,000 bond); on
165. Problems with respect to entitlement to dividends are minimized by the usual
New York Stock Exchange practice of setting the ex-payment date four days before the
record date. Since a buyer actually receives the certificate five days after the transac-
tion, a buyer before the ex-payment date can register the transfer on or before the record
date and thus ensure receipt of payment. See NYSE MANUAL A-155, A-156 (1968).
Of course, a buyer before the "ex-payment" date is entitled to the dividend even if he
does not register the transfer on or before the record date.
166. A witness explained how sales after the record date but before the ex-payment
date are handled:
On any sale after the record day and until the interest payment day, the
broker was required to attach to the bonds when delivered a 'due bill'
showing that the interest, when received, would be paid over to the pur-
chaser. Consequently, if defendant sold the bonds in question before June
2, it would have been required to give a due bill committing it to pay the
interest when received to the purchaser ....
518 S.W.2d at 854. This is the procedure set forth in the New York Stock Exchange
Manual for situations where the record date occurs before the "ex-payment" date. NYSE
MANUAL A-156 to -161. The due bill is redeemed on a date fixed by Exchange ruling.
Due bills are in standard form prepared by the Exchange; the manner of their execution
and guaranty is also prescribed by Exchange rules.




June 2, when the bonds traded ex-payment, the bonds dropped to between
85 and 87, reflecting -the payment. Hence, even accepting a reliance or
promissory estoppel theory of recovery, the plaintiffs would clearly be over-
compensated if they received both the full sales price for the bonds on May
22 and the full interest payment from the broker. If the plaintiffs had done
what they planned to do-i.e., sell the bonds on the first day that they would
be allowed to keep the interest payment-the bonds would have been sold in
the 85-87 range, not the 93-95 range. As it turned out, if the bonds had
been sold on June 2 at the opening price, 'Fox and Kiser would have made a
little more -than they did by the May 22 sale, but the difference would have
been measured in the hundreds, not thousands, of dollars. Hutton, the
broker, had voluntarily offered to pay this smaller amount, but the plaintiffs
were unsuccessfully shooting for the moon.
III. LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
A. The 1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act
These amendments are part of a continuing effort by the Section on
Corporation Banking and Business Law of the State Bar of Texas to provide
a flexible, modern, and simple business corporation statute well adapted to
the needs of the state. 168 The 1975 amendments were primarily designed
to resolve problems that had arisen under the much more substantial
amendments to the TBCA in 1973 or that had been overlooked in those
amendments. The 1975 amendments can be broken down into three broad
areas.
Share Transfer Restrictions.'69 The statutory provisions relating to share
transfer restrictions and to the form of certificates evidencing shares subject
to such restrictions were totally overhauled in 1973, partially in response to a
major Texas Supreme Court decision in the area. 170 This overhaul resulted
in several confusing provisions. Therefore, the 1975 amendments were
designed to restructure and clarify the existing provisions without making
major substantive change. The only substantive changes are the following:
(1) The definition of "conspicuous" was removed from article 2.19H
and placed in article 1.02A(19), the definitional section in which it logically
belongs, and "the location of such information" was specified as another
method of satisfying the requirement that certain information appearing on a
certificate be conspicuous. 17
(2) Article 4.01B(19) 172 was added to the provisions relating to the
168. The 1975 amendments are carefully and comprehensively analyzed in Bateman
& Dawson, The 1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act and The
Texas Securities Act, 6 TEx. TFCH L. REv. 951 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bateman &
Dawson].
169. Id. at 954-63.
170. Ling & Co. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1972) (failure
to comply with statutory requirement regarding buy-sell agreement resulted in restriction
being interpreted as option to corporation to purchase, and, therefore, was not neces-
sarily ineffective against bank using stock as security for loan).
171. TEx. BUs. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 1.02A(19) (Supp. 1975-76).
172. Id. art. 4.01B(19).
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permissible amendments of articles of incorporation to make it clear that
amendments may restrict the transfer of securities in accordance with the
new article 2.22F.173
(3) In a major improvement of overlapping and confusing provisions,
article 2.19G was modified to permit share certificates to state either that a
copy of the document in which the transfer restriction is based will be
furnished upon request by the corporation, or that the document is on file in
the office of the secretary of state. 174  Further, article 2.22E now permits
but does not require a corporation that had adopted a bylaw or is a party to
an agreement restricting the transfer of shares to make the bylaw or
agreement "a matter of public record" by filing with the secretary of state,
thereby permitting only a reference on the certificate that the bylaw or
agreement is available from the secretary of state.175  If the corporation
does not wish to make the bylaw or agreement a matter of public record, it
must be prepared to make a copy of the document available upon request
under article 2.19G.176  These simple and straightforward provisions are a
welcome relief from the confusion that existed under the prior statute.
(4) Finally, the new article 2.22F preserves a minor anomaly found in
the 1973 amendments by permitting incorporation by reference of a restric-
tion agreement into the articles of incorporation.177
Close Corporation Provisions. The close corporation provisions of the 1973
amendments were an ambitious attempt to develop an integrated set of
provisions suitable for the corporation with few shareholders. Such provi-
sions, which at first blush seemed rather simple and straightforward, had a
tendency to become involved as the draftsmen sought to cover all possible
contingencies. After the 1973 amendments were adopted several problems
developed which the 1975 amendments address.- 78  However, the result is
173. Id. art. 2.22F; see note 177 infra and accompanying text.
174. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.19G (Supp. 1975-76).
175. Id. art. 2.22E.
176. Id. art. 2.19G.
177. Id. art. 2.22F. The only reason to do this is a difference in filing fees. The
filing fee for articles of amendment is $100, id. art. 10.01A(2), while the fee for filing
a bylaw or agreement is $10.00. Id. art. 10.01A(22). Otherwise, the amendment provi-
sions seem equally convenient, though one can envision situations where a corporation
might be concerned about the appearance created by placing long documents directly
in otherwise short articles of incorporation.
178. The principal problems are described in the Bar Committee comment to TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1 (Supp. 1975-76) as follows:
[Flour specific questions arose after adoption of the close corporation
provisions concerning their operation upon corporations which met the
definition but did not desire to have the status of a close corporation.
One, the agreement among shareholders permitted by Art. 2.30-2A could
encompass matters which other provisions of the Act permit to be made
the subject of an agreement among any two or more, but not all, share-
holders of the close corporation in addition to matters which may con-
stitute significant variations from the corporate norm that are permitted
only under the close corporation provisions. There was some question
whether Art. 2.30-2A prohibited any agreement among shareholders of a
corporation which met the definition of a close corporation unless all
shareholders became a party to it. If the corporation and its shareholders
did not intend in the first instance to be a close corporation, such an in-
terpretation of Art. 2.30-2A would have unduly restricted the right of its
shareholders to contract among themselves in manners otherwise permit-
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both forbidding and disappointing: several pages of complex statutory
provisions are followed by several pages of equally complex "Comments"
explaining the provisions. In addition, the recent law review article careful-
ly explaining the 1975 amendments itself is difficult reading. 179 Further,
this article points to a number of uncertainties and ambiguities in these
sections which were created by the 1975 amendments and questions the need
for multiple incorporators of close corporations in some circumstances.
Fortunately, one of the major changes made by the 1975 amendments was
to give each potentially qualifying corporation an option whether or not to
become subject to these provisions.-8 0  The option is exercised by including
certain provisions in the corporation's articles of incorporation. It is my
view that most corporations do not need the special provisions, and the
simplest course for most attorneys to follow in the future is not to elect
inclusion under these forbiddingly complex statutes. The only situations
where election should be seriously considered are:
(1) Where the plan of incorporation involves execution of agreements
that may arguably restrict the discretion of directors in a way that may make
such agreements unenforceable as against public policy;' 8 '
(2) where there will be only one or two shareholders, and the option to
eliminate the board of directors and have business conducted directly by the
shareholders is attractive (though the option to have one or two directors
without electing close corporation status may be equally satisfactory); and
(3) where a minority shareholder desires to have an option to force the
dissolution of the corporation (though an option to dissolve may often be
provided by a shareholders' agreement or stand-by voting trust without
electing close corporation status). 18 2
ted by the Act. Two, Art. 2.30-2B provides that an agreement among
shareholders of a close corporation must be set forth in or made a part
of either the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the close corporation
in order for it to be valid. There was some question whether Art. 2.30
-2B might be interpreted to mean that an agreement restricting transfer
of shares among the shareholders of a corporation which did not intend
to be a close corporation but in fact met the definition would not be
valid even though the agreement met the requirements of Art. 2.22 and
Art. 2.19F (repealed by the 1975 amendments and replaced in this re-
spect by Art. 2.22F) for corporations generally. Three, Art. 2.30-3 per-
mits the shareholders of a close corporation to petition a court to enjoin
the corporation from taking any action which may cause it no longer to
be a close corporation. In this case, if a corporation which met the def-
inition of a close corporation but which did not and never intended to be
a close corporation decided to make a public offering of its shares, or to
sell shares to an additional number of persons after which the total number
of holders would exceed the permissible limitation, any of the sharehold-
ers of a corporation could petition a court to enjoin the public offering or
sale. Four, Art. 2.30-4 provides for the appointment of a professional
director upon application of any shareholder of a corporation which
meets the definition of a close corporation, whether or not it intended
to be a close corporation, in order to break deadlocks among the share-
holders or directors.
State Bar of Texas, Comment of Bar Committee, 3A Tax. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. 87-
88 (Supp. 1975-76).
179. Bateman & Dawson 963-90.
180. TEx. Bus. Cou'. Acr ANN. art. 2.30-1A (Supp. 1975-76).
181. See HAMILTON §§ 425, 687.
182. See id. § 690.
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The 1975 amendments made a number of substantive changes to the
statutory provisions, and a simple listing of the most significant ones may be
helpful:
(1) As indicated above, a corporation becomes subject to these provi-
sions only by a voluntary election indicated by including specified provisions
in the articles of incorporation;
(2) the maximum number of shareholders in a close corporation has
been increased to thirty-five; 183
(3) following the delectus personae concept of partnership law, a close
corporation may specify shareholder qualifications and may exclude certain
persons or classes of persons from being shareholders; 8 4
(4) all the initial subscribers to stock of a close corporation must serve
as incorporators of the corporation; 185
(5) where a close corporation has elected to be governed by the
shareholders without a board of directors, it is made clear that in the event
of disagreement, votes are counted in proportion to the number of shares
held rather than per capita; 8 6 and
(6) the provisions relating to shareholders agreements were modified in
two major respects. First, it is plainly stated that a failure to comply with
the precise requirements of article 2.30-2 does not invalidate an agreement
that would be valid under other provisions of the Texas Business Corporation
Act if the corporation were not a close corporation. 187 The principal effect
of this change is to make clear that agreements between some-but not all-
shareholders of a close corporation are valid where they comply with
requirements of article 2.30B as a pooling agreement. Second, it is evident
from the amendments that agreements are enforceable not only as against
the parties themselves but also as against persons acquiring shares from a
party by gift, bequest, or inheritance.' 88
Simplification of Corporate Formalities.8 9 In addition to correcting several
oversights and anomalies in the Texas Business Corporation Act, the 1975
amendments include several minor amendments designed to simplify proce-
dures to be followed by business corporations. Thus, the requirements as
to incorporators were drastically simplified. The number of incorporators re-
quired was reduced from three to one; the requirement that they be Texas
citizens was dropped; the age requirement of natural persons was reduced
from twenty-one to eighteen; and corporations, partnerships, trusts, and es-
tates are now permitted to serve as incorporators. 190 These changes reflect
the relatively minor role played by incorporators under the Texas Business
Corporation Act. Also, the various provisions of the Act that confused the
requirement of $1,000 initial capital with a minimum amount of stated
183. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-IA(4) (Supp. 1975-76).
184. Id. art. 2.30-1B.
185. Id. art. 2.30-1D.
186. Id. art. 2.30-1G(3).
187. Id. art. 2.30-2F.
188. Id. art. 2.30-2C.
189. Bateman & Dawson 990-95.
190. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.01 (Supp. 1975-76).
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capital were dropped, 19 1 thereby eliminating the basis for the questionable
rule adopted by the secretary of state's office that a corporation issuing only
par value securities must authorize enough shares so as to produce $1,000 of
stated capital if all shares were issued.192  Relatively minor changes were
also made in provisions relating to removal of committee members by the
board of directors, filing fees, dissolution before commencing business, and
qualification of foreign corporations. 193
B. The 1975 Amendments to the Texas Securities Act 94
By far the most significant change in the Securities Act is the provision
giving broad rulemaking authority to the State Securities Board. While the
board has published numerous "interpretations" and "guidelines" in the past,
they lacked the force and effect of law and were subject to abrupt change or
discontinuance. Further, in some instances the lack of rulemaking authority
resulted in the board's being forced to seek an opinion from the attorney
general as to the scope of its powers or meaning of the terms of the state
Securities Act. 195 Under section 28-1 the board now has power to adopt
rules "necessary to carry out and implement the provisions" of the Act,
including power to define the terms used in the Act "insofar as the
definitions are not inconsistent with the purposes fairly intended by the
policy and provisions of this Act."' 96 Before adopting rules and regulations
the board must follow the notice and comment provisions for rulemaking
required by the recently enacted Administrative Procedure and Texas
Register Act.' 97 This broad authority has been delegated by the board to
the securities commissioner as contemplated by the provisions of the Act. 198
Acting promptly pursuant to this grant of authority, the State Securities
Board has issued final rules, establishing procedures for future rulemaking
and contested cases, defining terms, and largely recodifying its numerous
previously issued "interpretations" and "guidelines." Copies of these rules
and regulations may be obtained directly from the State Securities Board.
The 1975 amendments also make several rather technical changes in the
Act to deal with new problems that have arisen since 1973. Only a brief
description seems necessary:
(1) A carefully drafted, narrow exemption from the registration provi-
sions of the Act for certain puts, calls, and other options was added. 199
This provision was felt necessary to permit free trading in these options as
191. Id. arts. 4.01C, 4.09A(5), 4.12E.
192. This "rule" is discussed in HAMILTON § 392.
193. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.43, 6.01A, 8.02, 8.05, 10.01 (Supp. 1975-76).
194. See generally Bateman & Dawson 995-1017.
195. Id. at 999-1001.
196. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-28-IA (Supp. 1975-76).
197. Id. art. 6252-13a, § 4. The Securities Act amendments prescribe a similar pro-
cedure, id. art. 581-28-1G,-28-1L, but these provisions were included only to take care
of the possibility that the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act might not
be enacted, and they are superseded by that Act. Id. art. 581-28-IF.
198. State Securities Board, Rules & Regulations § I(A) (3) (1976).




a result of an opinion by the Texas Attorney General that they were
"securities" subject to the Act.
(2) A decision by the Waco court of civil appeals200 that a person
rendering services in an exempt transaction could not recover compensation
unless he or she was a registered broker or dealer was, in effect, overruled
by modifying the statute to eliminate the constructional base on which the
court reached its conclusion. 20 1
(3) Another carefully drafted and narrow provision permits the commis-
sioner to obtain a receivership for persons acting as securities dealers in
conjunction with his investigation of potentially fraudulent activities under
section 32 of the Texas Securities Act. 20 2 This amendment was felt to be
necessary because of a holding by the Dallas court of civil appeals that only
a court in the county of the corporation's registered office could order a
receivership.20 3 This holding might have resulted in the state's being forced
to institute independent proceedings in two different counties in connection
with a single fraudulent practice; it seems clearly desirable to permit the
state in an appropriate case to pursue the remedies of injunction and
receivership in a single proceeding in a single county.
C. Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission
The availability of exemptions from federal registration requirements is a
matter of great concern for most fairly small corporations engaged in the
raising of capital. The exemptions usually availed of include the private
offer exemption, 20 4 the intrastate offer exemption,20 5 and "Regulation A"
(which requires what is in effect an abbreviated registration process). 20 6
During the survey period the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted
a new rule 240,207 an "exemption of certain limited offers and sales by
closely held issuers" that may be of considerable practical use for the small
corporation. The exemption is a limited one: it is available only to issuers
that have fewer than 100 beneficial owners both before and after the
offering. Further, no more than $100,000 may be raised under rule 240 in
any twelve-month period, no "general advertising or general solicitation"
may be used, and no commission or other remuneration may be paid for
solicitation of prospective buyers.
20 8
200. Rowland Corp. v. Integrated Systems Technology, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-34 (Supp. 1975-76), discussed in Bateman
& Dawson 1010-13.
202. Id. art. 581-25-1, discussed in Bateman & Dawson 1013-17.
203. King Commodity Co. of Texas, Inc. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1974, no writ). In this case the attorney general argued that the receivership
provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act were of limited application and the
older, more general, provision relating to receivership could be applied. The court re-
jected this argument. See also note 132 supra and accompanying text.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). See generally HAMILTON § 753.
205. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1970).
206. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1975).
207. Id. § 230.240.
208. It should be added that the exemption is only available to issuers, not controlling
shareholders. And, of course, the question of the availability of an exemption under
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Securities issued pursuant to rule 240 are restricted exactly as are shares
issued under the private offering exemption. Each issuer taking advantage
of rule 240 must take steps to ensure that each purchaser is acquiring the
securities for his own account, that the purchaser is aware of such restric-
tions, and that an appropriate legend is placed on each certificate. Notice
that this exemption has been availed of must be given to the SEC on a new
annual form, form 240.
Of course, in this day and age, $100,000 is not a great deal of capital for
many businesses. If more than that is required, and no other exemption is
available, some form of registration or compliance is necessary. Rule 240 is
apt to be particularly useful in connection with initial capitalizations, such as
thirty persons, some non-residents, contributing $1,000 to $5,000 each. It is
unlikely that an offering to thirty persons could be considered a private
offering under the Federal Securities Act even though it falls within the more
mechanical tests of the private offering exemption of the Texas Securities
Act. So long as the total raised is under $100,000, rule 240 would appear
to be tailored for such situations.
D. The ABA's Position on the Responsibility of Attorneys
in Securities Matters
The role and responsibility of attorneys who give advice and render
opinions in securities matters has been a matter of controversy for the last
several years. In several cases the Securities and Exchange Commission has
asserted that an attorney has an obligation to the public to prevent violations
of the securities acts as well as an obligation to his client. The famous
complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,209 in which two pres-
tigious law firms were named as defendants, has been followed by speeches
by SEC officials, 210 and several cases in which attorneys were named as
defendants, some of which arose during the survey period.211
the Texas Securities Act is unaffected by rule 240. Finally, the exemption is only from
the registration requirements; the antifraud provisions, particularly rule lOb-5, continue
to be applicable to closely held corporations if they utilize the mails or any means of
interstate commerce.
209. [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972).
The filing of this complaint is noted at 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1265 (1972). The proceeding
against the attorneys is still being contested. See SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
210. See, e.g., Sommer, Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get Here?, 30 Bus.
LAw. 95, 96 (1975); Sommer, The Commission and the Bar: Forty Good Years, 30
Bus. LAW. 6 (1974).
211. The most significant case is SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1973), in which the court ordered a hearing to determine whether an attorney giving
an opinion letter as to the availability of an exemption from registration should be en-joined from further violations of the Securities Act. The court stated that an attorney
might be liable as an "aider and abettor" if he were negligent, and that actual culpability
-knowledge of the improper scheme plus an intent to further that scheme-was unnec-
essary. The court said:
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective im-
plementation of the securities laws. . . . In the distribution of unregis-
tered securities, the preparation of an opinion letter is too essential and
the reliance of the public too high to permit due diligence to be cast
aside in the name of convenience. The public trust demands more of its
legal advisers than 'customary' activities which prove to be careless.
Id. at 541, See also SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Wood-
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The American Bar Association has sturdily resisted the imposition of
special public responsibilities on the attorney as being fundamentally incon-
sistent with his responsibility to his client. A focal point of this debate has
been over the responsibility of an attorney to advise the Commission of
possible securities violations that he learns of in his capacity as an attor-
ney.212 In February 1974 the disciplinary rules of the ABA were amended
to read as follows:
Rule 7-102(b) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing
that-( 1) his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client
to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when
the information is protected as a privileged communication. 213
The addition of the italicized language has formed the basis of an opinion by
the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association seeking to restore the
traditional rule about divulgence of clients' confidences. 214  The Ethics
Committee of the Texas Bar Association also released a formal opinion
during the survey period, restating the traditional rule and urging the SEC
not to call upon attorneys to divulge clients' confidences. 213  This opinion
refers to DR7-102 quoted above before its amendment. Both opinions
emphasize that the duty to disclose confidences under this disciplinary rule
should exist only when "fraud"-that is, active fraud with a requirement of
scienter or intent to deceive-is "clearly" established. In most instances of
possible securities fraud it will be difficult to show that an attorney was
"clearly" aware of such fraud in view of the uncertainty of the application of
numerous securities concepts. On the other hand, if an attorney is aware of
such conduct, he is likely to be personally responsible as an aider and
abettor, if not more.
The American Bar Association has also adopted a formal statement of
policy that lawyers should not be compelled to disclose information about
violations of the securities acts other than as set forth in the disciplinary rules
in the absence of a specified statute requiring such a change in the
traditional rule. The policies set forth in those rules, it was argued, "are
essential to the preservation of the concept of the attorney-client relationship
as part of our legal system," and the "statutes administered by the SEC give
it no power to require disclosure by lawyers concerning their clients beyond
ward v. Metro Bank, No. 742877 slip opinion (5th Cir., Nov. 3, 1975), and SEC v. Cof-
fey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975), applying a
stricter liability standard for aiders and abettors. See also White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d
724 (9th Cir. 1974), adopting a flexible or sliding scale approach to the determination
of liability. It is settled that a different standard is applicable in criminal proceedings.
United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
212. See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 437 (1974).
213. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsimLrrv DR 7-102(B), as amended, (Feb.
1975) (emphasis added).
214. Formal Opinion 341 (Sept. 30, 1975), published in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543 (1975).
215. Opinion 378 (Dec. 1974), published in 38 TEx. B.J. 156 (1975).
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what is provided in the CPR. '' 21 1 Thus, the lines of disagreement between
the SEC and ABA seem clearly drawn.
Another active area of dispute between attorneys and accountants is
whether attorneys should be compelled to disclose information about "unas-
serted claims" 217 in response to requests for information about liabilities
from auditors preparing accurate financial statements. During the survey
period an ABA committee released its final report, which was approved by
the Council of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association. 218 Early in January 1976219 a compromise was
announced under which the legal profession agreed to accept greater respon-
sibility to advise clients as to when securities law requires disclosure of
"unasserted claims" on the understanding that the attorney would not be
required to disclose such claims to auditors unless the client had already
disclosed them. Presumably, an attorney would feel compelled to withdraw
from the representation if a client consistently ignored advice that securities
law required disclosure of some unasserted claim. The precise nature of this
compromise will be reflected in model audit letters agreed to by representa-
tives of the American Bar Association, and the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants. 22
0
216. Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Responsi-
bilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients
with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAW. 543,
547 (1975).
217. These are possible liabilities for such things as product defects of which the at-
torney is aware but which have not matured or have not been asserted.
218. Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information-A Report by the
Committee on Auditors' Inquiry Responses, 31 Bus. LAW. 561 (1975). Earlier versions
of this report appear at 30 Bus. LAw. 513 (1975); 30 Bus. LAw. 989 (1975).
219. Lawyers and Auditors Find Compromise of Client Firm's Liabilities, Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 8, 1976, at 6, col. 2.
220. The general problem of the obligations of auditors and attorneys under the se-
curities acts has given rise to considerable discussion during the survey period. See, e.g.,
Call, Attorneys' Malpractice Insurance-Does Your Policy Cover Rule 10b-5 Liability?,
30 Bus. LAW. 1095 (1975); Chalmers, The Independent Auditor-Guarantor or Guide?,
31 Bus. LAW. 367 (1975); Proceedings, ABA National Institute: Advisers to Manage-
ment-Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAw. (Spe-
cial Issue, March 1975); Symposium, The Murky Divide: Professionalism and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Business Judgment and Legal Advice-What Is a Business
Lawyer?, 31 Bus. LAW. 457 (1975). See also Bialkin & Grienenberger, Summary of
the Meeting Between Members of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Rep-
resentatives of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Washington D.C.-Jan-
uary 2, 1975, 30 Bus. LAw. 1341, 1342-46 (1975).
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